The Nyaya Darshana

Translation and commentary by John Wells

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Introduction

This translation reveals an interpretation of the Nyaya Darshana that is substantially different from those done by Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1939) and S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1913), both of whom follow the interpretation of the traditional commentaries, especially that of Vātsyāyana (unknown date, but earlier than 5th century C.E.) Opinions as to the exact identity of the author Gautama, and as to the dates of composition of both the original and the early commentaries are widely divergent. I have used Vidyābhūṣaṇa as one of my sources for the original text in Devanagarī script, indicated by "Vb", the other source being that available from Maharishi University of Management, indicated by "MUM", from their wonderful and carefully prepared collection available online.

In the translation I have focused on a disciplined and faithful rendering of the sentences exactly as they appear in the original, without paraphrasing, and adding as few extra words as possible, although with the sparse and highly context-dependent "sutra" style of writing, it is necessary to supply some extra words. One example is reflexive pronouns—his, its, that, such, etc.—before nouns, the sense of which would have been an integral part of an ancient reader's understanding of the style. Verbs are almost nonexistent in this style and I, like all other translators, take the liberty of reading some nouns-only sentences in a compatible subject-verb format for clarity. I often supply extra words in parentheses to clarify the meaning, and by this practice I have been able to avoid excessive explanatory commentary. The resulting simplicity of presentation has been one of my primary goals.

I have thoroughly read and understood the intent of the other translations, but I find them full of religious and school-oriented bias and technically deeply flawed. In many sutras there is no attempt at a faithful translation at all, but instead an imposition of the translator's own original work (unacknowledged as such), as if to say, "Whatever the actual text, this is what he really means." Moreover, although some passages in the Nyaya are clearly presented as a dialectic, Vātsyāyana etc. mistakenly read nearly every phrase beginning with "na" (no), no matter how short, as a counterargument, often with extremely shabby "reasons", reading every ablative inflection as "because", while ignoring the many other possible uses of that case. Besides missing the incisive and richly interesting observations of the author that appear with a more thoughtful and disciplined translation, their interpretation boggles the reader's mind with phony reasoning and petty irrelevant squabbles, supposedly between various schools of thought, lined up against each other like football teams. As a result, they have managed to completely obscure what I consider to be one of the original expositions of the great Yoga philosophy.
Now some say that understanding this philosophy is not just a matter of reading translations disciplined by a study of grammars and dictionaries, and that is true, but neither does it help to ignore scholarship, hoping to absorb knowledge through faith by sitting at the feet of a revered and supposedly "enlightened" master. Obviously, one cannot do a translation by simply looking up the words in the dictionary, one by one, and patching them together into a translation. Translation from Sanskrit requires a thorough knowledge of how the language works, in all its complex and fascinating aspects, and it must be accompanied by a knowledge of syntax, roots, noun formations, secondary affixes, and noun cases, including special uses of, e.g., the genitive to abbreviate, the ablatives of separation and comparison, the locative absolute, etc. Still, for a student of the Yoga philosophy, the necessary accompaniment to the examination of texts is a devoted private examination of his consciousness itself, not devotion to a master.

The nineteenth-century scholars who brought the study of Sanskrit to the West based their grammars on those developed by centuries of Indian scholarship rooted in the great Astādhyāyī by Pāṇini (circa 500 BCE). Monier-Williams, Boehtlingk, etc., produced their dictionaries with the aid and guidance of contemporary Indian scholars, each in his own particular area of expertise. The enlightenment of these masters was one of scholarship and organizational skill, not of mystical or religious devotion. It is therefore entirely sufficient to learn the language from them, and to verify our intuitive knowledge of the philosophical principles in the Darshanas by knowledge of the language.

There are, however, some terms in the Monier-Williams dictionary that are apparently unique to the Darshanas and to the philosophical compendium Sarvadarśanasamgraha based on the early faulty interpretations. These are the only sources he cites for such words, and in these, he had no choice but to defer to his Indian Darshana experts, who in turn depended on the dubious traditional reading. Vātsyāyana himself surely lived and breathed Sanskrit, but he did not grasp the meaning of this work, the style and substance of which were probably centuries out of date even in his day. He took undue liberties in creating many "technical" meanings which bore no relation to the proper root-based meanings, all in order to support his false vision of a "Nyaya" school of reasoning. This has never been challenged by an independent translation, perhaps in part because of the stifling effect of an entrenched culture where it is forbidden to challenge authority, and where a reverence approaching worship toward spiritual leaders is encouraged.

Not being subject to this culture, I feel free to read the text according to its obvious literal meaning. For example, arthāpatti means "arriving at a meaning" or "interpretation", and jāti means birth-rank. Pravṛtti can mean a report or account,
prasāṅga "occupation with", and yugapat "simultaneous" with awareness, i.e., immediate or present, etc. Varna and suvarṇa in this work refer to caste, not color or gold. Bhāva is used variously by the author as "being" (existence), or a human "being", but also a way of being or thinking (see MW), i.e., a theory of being or ontology. (For simplicity, I have used "view".) Abhāva is sometimes used as the first element in bahūvṛīhi compounds, meaning devoid of being or "empty".

As for the structure of the work, it is evident to me that the numbering of sutras and so-called "books" in the Nyaya, as in the other Darshanas, was not part of the author's original text, but rather added later as an editorial device. Many of these incorrectly numbered divisions actually break up proper sentences and tend to disrupt a sensible reading of the original. Like the other Darshanas, I read this work as constructed of an orderly series of full statements (which I have numbered), rather than a string of tiny "aphorisms". Most of these statements consist of three connected ideas in the form of phrases or short sentences, arranged eighteen to a "chapter", with nine chapters in all. This all becomes evident by the distinctness of the statements and chapters, each with a clear beginning and end, by their natural thematic progression, by the physical length of each statement, which is remarkably consistent throughout the work; and by other clues, like the many statements containing clustered repetitions of a word, and many where "apratiṣedha" is the last word (the subject, whose predicate is stated in 1.2.14 to be the opening premise (1.1.1), and implied in every instance thereafter.)

Hopefully, by the foregoing, one may understand my main motivations for producing this translation (and the others) from a fresh perspective, unfettered by any obligation to conform with a flawed tradition. I fully understand that the fraction of the population that would be interested in this subject matter in the first place is already very small, and of those, the number that would find their way to this work would be even less. Still, anyone who has read my translations of the Darshanas will understand the irony that the thesis of this author, which is fundamentally the same as that of the authors of the other Darshanas, is inherently inconsistent with its being popular. So perhaps our isolation in this reading, both from tradition and from the general population, is as it should be, and we may now proceed from justifications to the happy task of enlightening ourselves in this philosophy.

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Chapter One - Introduction and pramāṇa-prameya

pramāṇa-prameya- the act of proving or validating vs. that which is to be validated

-saṁśaya-prayojana- uncertainty vs. motivation

-dṛṣṭānta-siddhānta- standard vs. doctrine

-avayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda- part(s) of the formal syllogism – discussion, examination – (for the sake of) settlement – dialectic

-jalpa- prattle, gossip

-hetu-ābhāsa- grounds for knowing – fallacious

-vitaṇḍā-chala- cavil, baseless argument for the sole purpose of winning – fraud, trickery, false persuasion (e.g. equivocation)

-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām class, birth-rank – subjugation, domination – taking a stance

(We are expected to recognize the obvious dvandvas here. The author seems to have chosen his words for that purpose. I have used "vs." to mean "considered against")

tattva-jñānāt (abl. by) essence – true comprehension niḥśreyasa-adhigamaḥ "without superior", highest – attaining, finding

duḥkha-janman – pravṛtti-doṣa – mithyā-jñānānām (gen. pl. belonging to, held or claimed by those) suffering – born – account(s) – false – mistakenly – comprehending

uttara-uttara-apāye (loc. once there is) higher and higher advancement – withdrawal
tat-anantara-apāyāt (abl. by) that – uninterrupted, continuous – going away, withdrawal

apavargaḥ completion, fulfilment

1.1-2 Finding the highest (dharma) is by truly comprehending the essence: 1.) of our validation (of truth), vs. that (truth) which is to be validated, 2.) of our uncertainty vs. our motivation, 3.) of our standard vs. our doctrine, and 4.) of the dialectic for settlement by discussion using the formal syllogism, vs. prattle: fallacious grounds, false persuasion for the purpose of hitting back, and taking a stance by dominating (the discussion) by virtue of (high) birth-rank; (whereas) the fulfilment of that (dharma), once there is (initial) withdrawal from the (dharma of) higher and higher advancement claimed by those mistakenly comprehending the false account of being born in suffering, is by (a state of) uninterrupted withdrawal from that.
(1.1.3) pratyakṣa – anumāna-apamāna-śabdāḥ (Pratyakṣa is ibc (beginning the compound), functioning like an indeclinable, and qualifying the other three words in the compound.) "right before the eye(s)", directly perceived, based on perception – inference – comparison – testimony pramāṇāni validations of truth

(1.1.4) indriya-artha-saṁnikarṣa-utpannam sense – object – "together-in-drawing" – invested with jñānam true comprehension // avyapadeśyam not to be designated, named, represented, etc. avyabhicāri-vyavasāya-ātmakam not deviating from – determination, resolve – characterized by pratyakṣam perception

1.3 Our ways of validating truth are: perception, inference, comparison, and testimony, where "perception" is a true comprehension, as one invested (only) with the drawing in together of his senses and their objects, not to be represented (by name or explanation), characterized by one's (uninterrupted determination not to deviate from that (by naming and explaining).

This is equivalent to YD 1.8, "Discipline is the resolve for staying in that state (of yoga) … with earnest attention to long-term continuance." I have freely supplied the pronouns "our" and "their" in the translation throughout the work, to indicate the author's unique and controversial Yogic thesis, vs. the more customary view of the would-be objector. Every translator does this in his own way. In some Darshanas the authors do not use "iti cet" to indicate an opposing voice, but leave it to the reader to recognize antithesis by the context.

(1.1.5) attha-tat pūrvakam following on that as the basis trividham threefold anumānam inference pūrvavat (vatup ind.) having (the nature of) the previous śeṣavat (vatup ind.) having (the nature of) remaining after sāmānyataḥ dṛṣṭam commonly known, universally agreed to ca and (1.1.6) prasiddha-sādharmanyāt (abl. of comparison w/upamānam; apart from) well-known – conformity sādhyasādhanam to be established (the premise) – establishing upamānam comparison (1.1.7) āpta-upadeśāḥ trusted authority – teaching śabdaḥ testimony
1.4 With that (perception) as the basis for it, there is our threefold inference, 1.) that it (truth) has the nature of that previous thing (immediate personal perception), (but also) 2.) that it has the nature of remaining after (the perception) and 3.) that it is universally agreed to. Our "comparison" establishes our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) as apart from conforming with a dharma that is well known. "Testimony" means the teaching of a trusted authority.

स द्विविधो द्रष्टाद्यथार्थवत्। आत्मशरीरिन्द्रयार्थवृद्धिमन: प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रत्यभावफलः खाप-वर्गांस्तु प्रमेयम्।

(1.1.8) sa that dvividhaḥ two ways dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa-artha-tvāt (abl. according to) commonly known – not commonly known – meaning – being (1.1.9) ātma-śarīra – indriya-artha – buddhi-manaḥ individual self – body – sense(s) – object(s) – conceptual understanding pravṛtti-doṣa – pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkha – apavargāḥ account – faulty, false – "state of existence having passed on", afterlife – "fruit", consequence – suffering – having done with (Pravṛtti here takes its secondary meaning, not the progress of life itself, but of the "news" or accounting of it. It is always associated with 'telling' words, like śabda here, vāk in 1.1.17, and yathokta in 4.1.1)) tu but prameyam (meant) to be validated

1.5 That (testimony) can (also) be seen two ways according to its meaning being either commonly known or not commonly known; but what we mean to validate is (not the testimony but) the conceptual understanding of the individual (ātman) with its body, and its senses with their objects, having done with the false account (testimony) of its (the ātman's) existence after death, of consequence (karma), and of suffering.

The author's prameya is literally what is "to be validated" by this examination, and his definition of it here is actually a concise statement of the thesis of this work. In the following pages he argues forcefully against the doctrines of karma and reincarnation on the part of many souls, and in favor of profound comprehension (jñāna) of the creation of the body, senses, and objects, through the agency of the pervasive consciousness of the one individual self or soul. This treatise is a comparison between a system based on faith and interpretation of scripture against a personal examination based on immediate experience.
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(1.1.10) iccha-dveśa-prayatna – sukha-duḥkha-jñānāni desire – aversion –
endeavor – happiness – suffering – conceptions ātmanāḥ (gen. of) individual self
liṅgam indicator (1.1.11) ceṣṭa-indriya-artha-āśrayaḥ physical behavior – senses
– object(s) – seat śarīrām body (1.1.12) ghraṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvac-śrotrāṇi
smelling – tasting – seeing – skin – hearing (-ana=action noun) indriyāṇi senses
bhutebhyaḥ (abl. known by) gross elements (1.1.13) pṛthivī earth āpaḥ water
tejaḥ fire vāyuḥ air ākāśam ether iti called, known as bhūtāṇi gross elements
(1.1.14) gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdāḥ smell – taste – form – feel – sound

1.6-7 The indication of this 'individual' is (in) its endeavors associated with
desire vs. aversion, and (in) conceptions regarding happiness vs. suffering,
and its "body" is the seat of the objects of both physical behavior and the
senses. The senses, known by their gross elements—'gross elements' meaning
earth, water, fire, air, and the ether—are the (mental) acts of smelling, tasting,
seeing, feeling, and hearing, which are the (actual) smell, taste, form, feel, and
sound (of things).

Clearly here in 1.1.10 he draws from the Vaisheshika 3.2.4 (3.12 JW) viz., "The
indications of the individual are ... endeavors regarding happiness vs. suffering
and desire vs. aversion." The nouns in 1.1.12 indicate the mental "act" of smelling,
tasting, etc., rather than the fleshy physical organs. The word "tvac" refers to sense
touch in the whole body, best translated in English as “feel”.

(1.1.14 cont.) pṛthivī-ādi-guṇāḥ earth – etc. – essential constituents tat
arthāḥ those – meanings (1.1.15) buddhiḥ knowing upalabdhiḥ observation
jñānam true comprehension iti these words, quotes // an-artha-antaram without
– meaning – alternate (1.1.16) yugapat-jñāna-anutpattiḥ simultaneous (with
awareness), without passage of time, present, immediate – true comprehension
– lacking the coming into existence // manasaḥ (gen. of) mind liṅgam indicator
1.8 The meanings of those (smell, etc.) is that they are the essential constituents of earth and the others (water, fire, air, ether), which (principle) is our "knowing", "observation", and "true comprehension". (But) without that alternate (or "inner") meaning, the immediate true comprehension does not come to exist. That (duality) is the indication of our mind. The declaration that the origination of this 'body' is in the knowing of it, is our account of life.

Again he draws from the Vaisheshika 3.2.1 (3.10 JW): "The indication of mind is the absence vs. presence of understanding regarding the drawing in together of the objects, the senses, and the individual."

1.9 The false ones (accounts) have the mark of commandments. The meaning that is induced by the false accounts is that there is reincarnation, that there is an existence after having died, that marked by affliction, one's suffering is a consequence (of something). Our 'having done with that' (however) is the ultimate liberation from such (suffering).
(1.1.23) samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatteḥ (gen. of) same – many – duty, destiny – evidence vīpratipatteḥ (abl. by) differing in understanding upalabdhi-anupalabdhi – avyavastāṭaḥ (tasil by) observing – not observing – not persevering ca and viśeṣa-apekṣaḥ differences – consideration vimarśaḥ examination, investigation saṁśayāḥ doubt, uncertainty (1.1.24) yam (acc. on) which artham (acc. toward) goal adhikṛtya (ind.part.) having made it the priority pravartate "he (one) proceeds" tat that prayojanam motive (1.1.25) laukika-parīkṣakāṇām (gen. of) (This genitive compound has the same referent, "vīpratipatti", as the genitive compound at the beginning of 1.1.23.) living an ordinary life – examining yasmin arthe (loc. abs. = yatra) in such a way that the goal is buddhi-sāmyam conceiving – equal in value sa it, such drśṭāntaḥ the "visualized goal", a standard, paragon or ideal; a vision or example of what is desired. (In these early statements we find a predominance of terms in the nominative case, whereas later there is heavy use of the ablative.)

1.10-11 Our 'uncertainty' is an investigation, a consideration of those particular things (senses and objects 1.10-14) by differing in our understanding of the evidence of the dharmas of the many all the same, and by not persevering there, whether observing or not observing (our dharma). Our "motive" is the thing on which we proceed toward that goal, having made it the priority. That (differing in understanding of the dharmas) of those just living life and those seeking to examine it, in such a way that the goal is to conceive of them as equal in value, is our "standard".

Finding the investigation difficult, one may give up in frustration, but that is not what the author means by "uncertainty" here. Conversely, giving up one's perseverance in a rigid and exclusive belief system may lead to uncertainty, but a contemplative investigation of that very uncertainty may lead to "liberation" (see 1.1.22 and 2.1.6). One's motivation then shifts from perseverance in ritual practices and objective thinking to a determined (1.1.4) investigation of the subjective reality.
(1.1.26) tantra-adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama-saṁsthitiḥ framework, system, model, theory – creating a priority – accepting – combined stance siddhāntaḥ doctrine (1.1.27) sa this catur-vidhaḥ four ways sarva-tantra-prati-tantra - adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama - saṁsthiti-artha-antara-bhāvāt (abl. according to) everyone – system, framework (lit. "warp threads"), theory – opposing – theory – putting at the head, creating a priority – going along with, accepting – coexistence – meanings – separate – being, way or theory of "being" (MW), view

1.12 Our "doctrine" is the combined stance that we create that priority (as opposed to equal value 1.1.25) as our theory and that we accept it. This can be seen four ways according to a view of separate meanings in the coexistence of a theory for everyone as an opposing theory, vs. creating the priority and accepting it.


1.13 We do not prohibit a theory for everyone, (so) our doctrine of a theory for everyone is that in that theory, our meaning ("artha" 1.1.14 and 1.1.15 as opposed to 1.1.20) is made the priority, while our doctrine of an opposing theory is established as an equivalent (see Chapter Nine) to that theory, which is established as a theory for others.
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(1.1.30) yat siddhau (loc. upon) the establishment of which anya-prakaraṇa-siddhiḥ other – subject – establishment saḥ the thing adhikaraṇa-siddhāntaḥ creating a priority – doctrine (1.1.31) aparīkṣita-abhyupagamāt (abl. apart from; aparīkṣita vs. parīkṣaṇam) who has not carefully examined – acceptance. tat-višeṣa-parīkṣaṇam that – particular(s) – carefully examining abhyupagama-siddhāntaḥ agreeing, acceptance – doctrine

1.14 (Likewise,) our doctrine of creating a priority is the thing upon the establishment of which there is (then) the establishment of the subject (of dharma) for others, while our doctrine regarding acceptance is to carefully examine the particulars of that (theory), as apart from the mere acceptance on the part of one who has not carefully examined it.

(1.1.32) pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigamanāni assertion – grounds – general rule – application – conclusion avayavāḥ subdivisions or parts of the syllogism (1.1.33) sādhyā-nirdeśaḥ "to be established", premise – dictating (before proving it) pratijñā assertion (1.1.34) udāharaṇa-sādharmyāt (abl. by) general rule – conformity sādhyā-sādhanam premise – establishing hetuḥ grounds (1.1.35) tathā similarly vaidharmyāt (abl. by) nonconformity

1.15 The (formal) subdivisions (of that examination) are: the assertion, the grounds for it, the general rule (that applies to the assertion and the grounds), the application (of the rule), and the conclusion. Our assertion (1.1.1) (simply) dictates our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), and our grounds establishes that premise by conformity with our general rule, and similarly, by nonconformity (of the opposite).
1.16 Our general rule is our standard (1.1.25), that one is destined to his dharma either by conformity with our premise, or the reverse, by opposition to it; and the application (of the rule) for our premise, is our conviction, considered by means of that rule, saying either, "It is so", or "It is not so."

1.17 The conclusion is the reaffirmation of our assertion (but this time) by pointing out our grounds. The discussion of that (grounds), given that its object is that essence which is not yet understood, is a deliberation for the purpose of the true comprehension of that essence that results from our 'cause' (īśvara 4.1.19) becoming evident.
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(1.1.41) *vimṛśya* (indeclinable participle) after having investigated *pakṣa-prati-pakṣābhyām* (inst. dual; by means of) side – opposing – side *artha-avadhāraṇam* object – confirmation *nirṇayaḥ* settlement (1.2.1) *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambhaḥ* *(The inflection is singular; not the dual: "supporting and condemning").* means of validation – discussing – establishment – criticizing *siddhānta-aviruddhaḥ* doctrine – without prohibition *pañca-avayava-upapannaḥ* five – members – invested *pakṣa-prati-pakṣa-parigrahaḥ* side – opposing side – claiming as one's own *vādaḥ* dialectic

1.18 "Settlement" means confirmation of that object, after having investigated by means of (comparing) the one side and the opposing side; and the dialectic (presented in this treatise), claiming both the one side and the opposing side as our own, criticizes the establishment (of our claim) by discussing our means of validation as one invested with those five subdivisions of analysis, but without prohibiting our doctrine.

The author is not inventing the formal five-part syllogism here. These definitions of the five are only as they apply to his thesis of dharma. In fact, this work is not a treatise on logic in general. He makes it clear throughout the work that his thesis, like the Vaisheshika, is about dharma. There is no mistaking it.

1.) The assertion is his premise that if one is to find the highest dharma, then there must be true comprehension of the essence of the principles given in the opening sutra, considered against their complements, also given. (This is a conditional "if A then B", not a simple subject/predicate assertion.)

2.) The reason or grounds for knowing this is that one does comprehend this essence, because its "cause" has become evident (see 1.1.40). The author explicitly declares in 4.1.19 that his cause (kāraṇa) is Īśvara, meaning not "God" as a religious concept, but rather the supreme human spirit that can be identified in meditation and in activity as one's own consciousness (See YD 2.1-6). *Direct experience* of this provides the grounds, not dogma. The opposing side's cause ("nimitta") is karma.

3.) The general rule is dual: that if either version of dharma is to be known, then it's cause must be known (either Īśvara for the highest dharma, or karma for common dharma). This rule is 4.) applied to our premise with a thorough examination, and then the assertion is 5.) reaffirmed. Those are the five subdivisions.
Chapter Two - Prattle

2.1 Prattle, as one who is invested with the (traditional) 'so it has been declared (by scripture)', is their prohibition (disciplinary) of our way through the false persuasion of taking a stance by dominating (the discussion) by virtue of their high (scholarly, priestly) birth-rank, which is merely hitting back, propping up inadequate opposing side – causing to stand, propping back

1.2.2 yathā-ukta – upapannah so it has been declared (by scripture, not "earlier in this text") – invested chala – jāti-nigraha-sthāna – sādhana-upālambhaḥ false persuasion – birth-rank – dominating – standing firm, taking a firm stance – way of establishing something (pairs with sādhyā 1.2.4) – finding fault, prohibition, discouragement (The word "jāti" means birth-rank, especially of the high-born, and "sthāna" is their stance. These are key terms here and they serve as the basis for the following material. The translation of jāti as a futility or futile argument is unfounded and utterly wrong.) jalpaḥ idle talk, prattle, gossip (1.2.3) sa it, this pratipakṣa-sthāpanā opposing side – causing to stand, propping up hīnaḥ inadequate vitanḍā hitting back

1.2.4 savyabhicāra-ānusāraṇaḥ having deviation from something (Adhering to the context, the referent is sthāna 1.2.2.) – prohibited -prakaraṇa-sāma-subject – equivalent, substitute -sādhyā-sāma- premise – equivalent -kāla-atītāḥ to be done – equivalent – time – past hetu-ābhāsāḥ reason or motive, grounds for knowing – pretenses (1.2.5) anaikāntikaḥ not exclusively one way savyabhicāraḥ deviation (1.2.6) siddha-antam (acc.) doctrine abhyupeta (ind. part.) having agreed to (w/acc.) tat-virodhi it – in direct opposition to viruddhaḥ prohibition
2.2 Their pretenses as to grounds are: that any deviation from that (stance) is prohibited, that that (stance) is equivalent (see Chapter Nine) to our subject (dharma), that it is equivalent to our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), and that there is a time gone by (past life). Our deviation is not just the one way, (and) having agreed to our doctrine (of coexistence 1.1.26), such a prohibition (against deviation from their way) would be in direct contradiction to it.

2.3 Whatever such anxious thought there may be about the subject (dharma), that (method of prohibition and reproach see 2.1.65) is then offered as an equivalent to our subject, as a pretext with the object of settlement (by intimidation). That is an undistinguished premise because it has yet to be demonstrated, (but is offered as) an equivalent of our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension). Their 'time gone by' is a pretext about the lapsing of time.
2.4 "False persuasion" is an attack against our thesis by effecting this diversity of meanings. False persuasion by speech (equivocation) is making up an alternate meaning, apart from the author's intended one, while it is held that there is no distinction in the meaning.

2.5 Where such making up of the meaning has not arisen, there is false persuasion by universality, because it is possible by just joining along with a meaning that is absolutely universally agreed to. False persuasion by figure, in dictating a diversity of dharmas, denies the true meaning (of dharma).
2.7 Ranking by birth (caste) is the mutual opposition of life standing as established by conformity vs. nonconformity (with duty or personal quality determined by birth), and taking a stance by dominating (the other classes) is a difference of understanding, that is indeed a lack of understanding. From the (notion of) diversity of that (dharma), there arises the notion of the many taking a stance that results from domination by the high-born.

As in the Vaisheshika, sādharmya and vaidharmya here as "similarity vs. dissimilarity" does not refer to the attributes of objects, but to inclusion and exclusion of people by castes according to the qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas.

In traditional religious thinking, conformity vs. non-conformity with one's natural born dharma or duty in past lives is the main cause of one's status in the present life, for better or worse. Standing firm through domination by class is the obstruction of independent thinking through the claim of intellectual superiority by virtue of such birth-rank, or by training, title, reputation, veneration, or divine inspiration.

It even extends to the fraudulent pretense to the possession of supernatural abilities or to infallibility by virtue of "enlightenment" or sainthood, either by direct claims on the part of spiritual leaders, or by their failure to deny any such naive assumptions held by their followers. Too often a title earned by training serves only as a formal sign that one has demonstrated a commitment not to think independently but rather to follow and possibly attempt to build on a certain pre-established line of thought. This works well enough for science, but not for ontology or epistemology.
2.1.1 samāṇa-aneka-dharma-adhyavasāyāt (abl. because) same – many – dharma – firm resolve anyatara-dharma-adhyavasāyāt (abl. about) the other of the two – dharma – firm resolve (See "absence of dispute, like it is with dharma" SD 7.4.) vā or na no saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (This section recalls 1.1.23) (2.1.2) vi-pratipatti – avyavasthā – adhyavasāyāt (abl. due to) considering a contrary opinion – without perseverance – a state of resolve ca and (2.1.3) vipratipattau (loc. even when) difference of opinion or understanding ca and sampratipattau (abl. due to) agreement (The vā clause followed by a ca clause indicates a one-to-one relation between their respective terms, as it does in SD 8.13.) [\text{(2.1.4)}] avyavasthā ātmani / vyavasthitatvāt ca avyavasthāyāḥ; The failure to persevere is within one's soul, and it results from being fixed in that situation, which results (in turn) from one's (previous) failure to persevere.]

2.8 There is no uncertainty there, either because of the firm resolve that there is a dharma for the many all the same, or (in our case) because of the (contrary) firm resolve as to that other (inner) dharma (cf. 1.1.23); and this is (in the first case) due to that firm resolve being without any perseverance in considering the contrary opinion, and (in our case) due to agreement (with that first) even when one does have a contrary opinion.

2.1.5 tathā in that way, that is how atyanta-saṁśayaḥ ultimate – uncertainty tat-dharmaḥ tat (\text{refers to anyatara in 2.1.1}) ātata-upapatteḥ (abl. known from) (śyaṇ bhāvārtha form of ātata) being spread – evidence (2.1.6) yathā-ukta – adhyavasāyāt (abl. from) declared so far – resolve eva indeed tat-viśeṣa-apekṣāt (abl. arising from) them – difference – considering saṁśayena (inst. by means of) uncertainty asaṁśayena freedom from uncertainty na not atyanta-saṁśayaḥ ultimate – uncertainty vā instead [\text{(2.1.7)}] yatra saṁśayaḥ tatra evam uttara-uttara-prasaṅgāḥ; Wherever there is doubt (of dharma), there it surely becomes more and more advanced.] As in 2.1.4, the commenter says that we should accept our dharma as prescribed by verbal authority, without examination.
2.9 That is how there arises the ultimate uncertainty that the dharma of that (other way "anyatara" 2.1.1) is known from the evidence of its being spread (among the many "aneka" 2.1.1). Indeed, from one's resolve (motivation) upon what has been declared (here), it is rather by means of the uncertainty that arises from considering the difference between them that there is instead freedom from uncertainty, and not that ultimate uncertainty.

At this point, it should be clear to anyone that the Nyaya Darshana is not an investigation of the science of reasoning or logic. It is an attempt to form a reasoned reconciliation between two undeniable but seemingly mutually exclusive ways of understanding the experience of life itself.

He ends this half of the chapter by mentioning uncertainty. Interestingly, he appears to be saying that this uncertainty should never be resolved, and the motivation to resolve it should never cease. Apparently it is the constant adventure of the inner investigation itself, with the principles of the Darshanas in mind, that is the important thing, as opposed to formulating a pat answer that can be expressed by a few aphorisms and then forgotten, or as opposed to persisting in religious rituals. The way of Yoga is the regular practice of investigation into one's own consciousness, along with some awareness of these principles in daily life, but not so that we might one day snap into a permanent state of "enlightenment" and bliss. According to the Darshanas, Yoga (4.2.42) is both the way and the goal.

**Pramāṇa and Prameya and Pratyakṣa**

Pramāṇa (validation of knowledge)

प्रत्यक्षादिकं प्रयास्य चौकल्यासिद्धे। पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धं नैन्द्रियार्थतिमिकर्षां वर्त्तते।।

(2.1.8) pratyakṣādīnām (gen. pl. of) perception etc. aprāmāṇyam lack of credibility traikālya-asiddheḥ (abl. because) threefold time – no affirmation (2.1.9) pūrvam before, past hi for pramāṇa-siddhau (loc. when) validation – affirmation na no indriya – artha – saṃnikarṣāt (abl. through) sense – object – together-in-drawing pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ perception – manifestation

2.10 There is a certain lack of credibility of perception and the others, because we cannot affirm threefold time: for when we (try to) affirm our validation for past (incarnations) there is no (present) manifestation (of reality) by perception, through the drawing in together of sense and object.
2.11 When we try to affirm that (validation) for future (incarnations), there is no affirmation of our prameya ("to be validated") (including the denial of future incarnation. See def. of prameya 1.1.9.) by those means of validation. When (however) we affirm that (validation) as immediate (present), there is no such thing as modes of life by stages (incarnations), on the part of intellects (plural), each one being so defined (by his stage).

2.12 There is no evidence for denying (our premise, the true meaning of dharma 1.2.14), because there can be no affirmation of threefold time, and there is also no evidence for that denial because it would be a denial of our whole means of validation. Or, considering the existence of that (particular) pramāṇa (immediate perception), one cannot deny our whole means of validation (of dharma).
(2.1.15) traikālya-apratīṣedhaḥ the threefold time – not denying ca and (paired with the following ca) śabdāt (abl. by) sound ātodya-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ "to be struck", a drum – establishing – a possibility becoming actual or evident (2.1.16) prameyā (f. to match tulā) (the need) to be validated ca it is also true that tulā-prāmāṇyavat (vatup as ind.) a balance scale – having validity (2.1.17) pramāṇataḥ (tasil resulting from) validation siddheḥ (abl. by) affirmation pramāṇāntara-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ means of validation – inner – affirmation – occupation with life

2.13 (Even) without denying the threefold time, the affirmation of a drum (for example) becomes evident by its (immediate) sound, but it is also true that a measuring scale needs to be validated (calibrated) to have validity, (so) the occupation with life that is affirmed by our inner means of validation is (also affirmed) by the affirmation of the (three) means of validation, which results from validation (of them as follows: see 2.15-3.18.)

Prameya ("to be validated")

(2.1.18) tat-viniṛtteḥ (abl. by) those – turning away vā or pramāṇa- siddhivat (vati just like) validation – affirmation prameya-siddhiḥ to be validated – affirmation (2.1.19) na not pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhivat (vati like) lamp – light – affirmation tat-siddheḥ (abl. through) those – affirmation (2.1.20) kvacit in one nivṛtti-darśanāt (abl. ind.) cessation – seeing anivṛtti-darśanāt (abl. ind.) non-cessation – seeing ca and kvacit in another anekāntaḥ not just one

2.14 Or (see "or" 2.12), by turning (one's attention) away from those (means), there is, just like the affirmation by our means of validation, the (immediate) affirmation of what is to be validated like the affirmation of a lamp by its light, which is not through affirmation by those means of validation. Seeing its cessation in the one case (perception), and seeing no cessation in the other case (reasoning), there cannot be just the one way.
If the light from a lamp is concealed by a pot, the normal view is that it still exists, but according to the subjectivist philosophy, it does not. He assumes that we are familiar with this example, which is similar to the well-known philosophical question (the one that isn't satisfied by the obvious, yet so very obtuse, scientific answer): "If a tree falls in a forest, without anyone to hear, does it make a sound?"

**Pratyakṣa (Perception)**

\[pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-anupapattiḥ\] perception – qualities – no evidence
\[asamagra-vacanāt\] (abl. ind) lack of a whole – asserting (2.1.22) **na** not **ātma-manasoḥ** (gen. dual; of the two) individual self – mind **saṁnikarṣa-abhāve** (loc.) drawing-in-together – in/loc. in the absence of, without **pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ** (see also 2.1.9) perception – coming into existence (2.1.23) **dik-deśa – kāla – ākāśeṣu** (loc. with) direction and location – time – space **api** even **evam** exactly as it is **prasaṅgaḥ** occupation with life

2.15 There can be no evidence of the qualities of a perception by asserting the lack of (perception as) a whole. Without the drawing in together of the individual self and the mind, perception would not even come to exist. That (self) is our occupation with life, just as it is, even with (the qualities of) direction and location, time, and space.

\[jñāna-liṅga-tvāt\] (abl. since) true comprehension – indicator(s) – existing as **ātmanah** (gen. of) individual self **na** not **anavarodhah** without separating out (see nirodha in YD) \*(The meaning here is very dependent on the context.)* (2.1.25) **tat-ayaugapadya-liṅga-tvāt** (abl. because) it – without immediacy – indicator – the fact that **ca na** but not **manasaḥ** (gen. of) mind \*(has the same referent as ātmanah)* (2.1.26) **pratyakṣa-nimitta-tvāt** (abl. because) perception – instrumental cause – would be **ca** and // **indriya-arthayoh** (gen. dual; of) sense – object **saṁnikarṣasya** (gen. of) drawing in together **svaśabdena** (inst. by way of) one's own testimony **vacanam** assertion
2.16 That (self) is not (known) without separating that (evidence) out, since that (evidence) exists only as an indicator in the true comprehension of oneself; but not of one's mind, because of the fact that without the immediacy (of true comprehension) that (mind) is also just an indicator of it, and because it would be the *instrumental* cause of perception. By way of our self-testimony, *that* (statement about mind) is an assertion of the drawing in together (only) of sense and object (not self).

सूत्व्यासक्तमनसांचेन्द्रार्थयोऽसनिकर्षनिमित्तत्वात्। तैशापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम।

व्याहतत्त्वादेवः।

(2.1.27) *supta-vyāsakta-manasām* (gen. pl. of; *ref. is the same as that of saṁnikarṣasya*) asleep – stuck – minds *ca* also *indriya-arthayoh* (gen. dual; of) sense – object *saṁnikarṣa-nimitta-tvāt* (abl. arising from) perception – instrumental cause – the notion (2.1.28) *taiḥ* (inst. with) those *ca* and *apadesāḥ* pointing out *jñāna-viśeṣāṇām* (gen. pl. of) comprehension – particulars (2.1.29) *vyāhatatvāt* (abl. because) being in conflict *ahetuḥ* without grounds

2.17 There is also that (assertion) of minds that are asleep and attached, arising from the notion of that (the object) being the *instrumental* cause in the drawing in together of sense and object, and it is with those (minds) that we would find their pointing out the *particulars* of their comprehension, which is without (our) grounds for knowledge because of its being in conflict with that.

नार्थविशेषप्रावक्त्यात्। प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धे:। न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदध्य-पतम्भात्।

(2.1.30) *na* not *arthava-viśeṣa-(gen.)-prābalyāt* (abl. following from) object – particular – predominance, pre-existence (2.1.31) *pratyakṣam* perception // *anumānam* inference *ekadeśa-grahaṇāt* (abl. by) single individual – grasp, personal understanding or apprehension (*Ekadeśa means a part of a whole. Here it is a "single individual" as part of the whole of humanity. *Grahaṇa* is not sensory perception like *pratyakṣa.*) *upalabdheḥ* (gen. of *ref.=prābalya*) observation (2.1.32) *na* no *pratyakṣeno* (inst. by) perception *yāvat_tāvat* just as much as, just as true as *api* either *upalambahāt* (abl. for) a matter of personal recognition
2.18 (But) perception does not follow from the predominance of particular objects. That (predominance) of observation by personal apprehension on the part of each single individual is (only) inference (see 1.1.5). That (inference) is not just as true as it would be by (direct) perception either, for that is a matter of (personal) recognition.

One's own personal "grasp" of ideas is known by direct experience, but that of others is inferred, which is obvious but of little importance outside the theories of subjective idealism and solipsism. That there is sensory perception and mental processing on the part of others is a solid inference within the scientific theory of human beings (including oneself) as soulless purposeless particle-based life machines, each representing a unique accidentally self-propagating species.

Moreover, the idea that others have a grasp of abstract ideas, or of a soul, or indeed that they are souls or selves, as true as that may be, must be modeled after one's own grasp. Anything beyond the idea of robotic data processing and sharing through the interface of language begins to require a belief in "some kind of" abstract higher being. But let's face it, this means God, a human-like being with qualities like will, the capacity to discriminate or judge, to love, to be pleased, displeased, appeased, etc. We imagine God as like us, but not limited in knowledge or power, not mortal, and of course not visible, and not limited to being physically present in any particular location, but these attributes of greatness are not truths but only thoughtless boolean negations of our own perceived limitations.

Outside of the memorized, school-taught, explanation of humanity as soulless life "forms", all one knows for sure, in the present, where all knowledge is found, is one's own inner knowledge of what it feels like to be alive and aware and human. It is an immediate, unmistakable, and as yet unexplained, sphere of perception beginning with ethereal sound, breath, and feel. It is by that model that we infer a similar inner humanity in others. This so-called "inference", as vital and true as it must be, belongs neither to reason, science, or the philosophies of solipsism, subjective idealism, or any other philosophy, but to religion.

Thoughtful religious people the world over find themselves compelled to accept science, but the reverse is not the case. Even modern masters in philosophy distance themselves from the issue of self or soul, as they would certainly distance themselves from religion. It is, however, within the religious perspective that one finds some acknowledgement of the inescapable duality of the two humanities, and that is why I consider theism to be superior to atheism, but solely in the abstract, for I have no affection for the antagonistic tribalism of institutional religion.
The teaching of the Darshanas, on the other hand, transcends that of science, philosophy, and religion, even though it may be difficult to grasp. The problem with understanding it is that the principles being revealed, as close as they are to the intuitive intelligence of the sensitive reader, are necessarily foreign or even hostile to his schooled or tribal mind. Therefore, the task at hand, for anyone who is receptive and motivated to come to an understanding, is to earnestly and persistently engage in an effort to reconcile the two opposing views in order to bring them to union. This journey is called Yoga. It is not any kind of self-help. In fact, all the authors agree that it is not a matter of seeking the ultimate happiness but of seeking the ultimate dharma, which is the understanding itself.

Chapter Three - Inference, Comparison, and Testimony

Inference

साध्यत्वादवयविनि संदेहः। सर्वाघ्रणमवयव्यसिद्धे। धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेष्ठ। सेनावन-वदु महगमिति चेत।

(2.1.33) sādhyatvāt (abl. because) having to be demonstrated avayavini (loc. about) having parts, a subdivided whole samdehaḥ doubt (2.1.34) sarva-agrahaṇam everyone (all things?) – no personal apprehension avayavi-asiddheḥ (abl. because) possessor of parts – no affirmation (2.1.35) dhāraṇā - ākarśaṇa-upapatteḥ (abl. since) holding in mind, remembering – drawing in – evidence ca and (2.1.36) senā-vanavat (vati like) army in battle array – forest grahaṇam personal apprehension iti_cet to the objection: (This objection and reply format is meant to be read, where appropriate, until 2.2.6, being refreshed in 2.2.9.)

3.1 To the objection that there is doubt about a subdivided whole (self), because that would have to be demonstrated; that because there is no affirmation of that subdivided whole, there can be no personal apprehension of one being 'everyone' (implied in 2.1.30-32); and that because our evidence is (only) a 'drawing in' of something we hold in mind, our personal apprehension (of a whole) must be like a (figurative) forest of an army, …

Here the doubter in us leans toward the theory that the parts of a whole are the prior reality, underlying the concepts of whole things. We consider, for example, that we only know of a whole entity like an "army" from directly seeing the soldiers as its parts, and that the concept of an army is learned and remembered, not perceived.
3.2 (the reply is:) That is not the case, because of the (most) minute things' being beyond one's powers of sense. The inference of them is not our means of validation (see 2.1.30-31), for our deviation would be by likenesses (of soldiers) being blocked and struck, and not just by likenesses of the single individuals' (soldiers') fear (of being blocked and struck), (this) according to the view of our alternate meaning.

The mention of fear, blocking, striking, and falling, are obviously meant to flesh out the analogy of an army in battle. The word "aṇūnām" (2.1.36) does not mean "of atoms", or sub-atomic particles as we know them today. (We do infer them now from empirical evidence.) It refers to the smaller and smaller parts that make up any whole in general. The ancients must have guessed, as well as anyone would, that what was visible to the naked eye was not the limit of minuteness. While in a way it is true that one perceives the individual soldiers and not the "army" as a whole, that doesn't really work, because it doesn't stop there. We could just as easily say that the concept of the "whole" soldier is only secondary to perceiving his limbs, which are in turn secondary to their parts, and so on down to where the most minute parts of all must be imperceptible. That is the author's point in his first remark.

The definition of inference for the purposes of this treatise is found early on, in sutra 1.1.5b. Based on immediate perception, it is the affirmation that the thing being perceived is something that remains after the perceiving is done and that the perception of it may be commonly shared by others. The fact that the object remains and the fact that others may share the experience are not known from the direct experience itself but are a secondary knowledge. Those two criteria, however, are not the case for all kinds of experience, but serve as a way of confirming that the experience is real only in a physical objective sense. Things
like fantasy, pain, and fear, on the other hand, do not remain after one stops thinking of them, nor are they available for others to perceive. Interestingly, whereas "fear" here is a certain anticipation of possible future events, "being blocked or struck" is expressed in the past passive participle, and "falling" is expressed with the present participle.

वर्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितवचकालोपपत्ते:। तथोरणभावो वर्तमानाभावे तद्दैषक-त्वात।

(2.1.39) vartamānā-bhāvaḥ existing in the present patataḥ (gen. (of patat) of) falling (ref. = trāsa 2.1.38) patita-patitavya-kāla-upapatteḥ (abl. because) fallen – yet to have fallen (fut. pass. part.) – time – evidence (2.1.40) tayoḥ (gen. of) those two api indeed abhāvaḥ no existence, absence vartamānā-bhāve (loc. when) in the present – being tat-apekṣatvāt (abl. because) them – consideration

3.3 That (fear) of falling (dying in battle) would exist in the present, because there is evidence of time (only) in his having already fallen or in his having yet to fall. There is indeed a complete absence of those two things (past and future) when being in the present moment, because that (evidence) is only a (mental) consideration of them.

नातीतानागतचोरितेतरापेक्षासिद्ध:। वर्तमानाभावेक वर्तमानाभावन्निः। रवृत्तमानाभावन्निः। तत्तता-कर्त्तव्योपपपपपिन्नूषयथा ग्रहणम्।

(2.1.41) na no atīta-anāgatayoh (gen dual; of) past – future itaretara-apekṣā-siddhiḥ one against the other – (by) considering – proof (2.1.42) vartamānā-bhāve (loc. as) (in) the present – existing sarva-agrahaṇam everyone – lack of personal apprehension prayākṣa-anupapatteḥ (abl. coming from) perception – missing the evidence (2.1.43) kṛtatā-kartavyatā-upapatteḥ (abl. because) the having done – the having yet to be done – evidence tu but, however ubhayathā both ways grahaṇam personal apprehension

3.4 There is no proving past and future (incarnations) by considering one (person) against another. The lack of personal apprehension of being 'everyone' comes from missing the evidence regarding perception as it exists in the present. Our personal apprehension, however, is both ways, because there is (also) the evidence of there being something done and something yet to be done (our dharma).
It is easy to think of time as a line that one can trace backward or forward in opposite directions, and in that simplistic sense, the past might seem to be the "opposite" of the future ("that which is not the future" cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa), but no one thinks of past and future in that way. One thinks of the past as what one did and what happened in the world as it might affect one's own health, wealth, status, enjoyment, etc. One thinks of the future as what one intends to do or what will probably happen as it might affect those things. In any case, memory, as well as planning and anticipation, occupy the present—not the point on a timeline designated as the present, but the only-time present of immediate awareness. For the yogin in his solipsist mode, there does not exist a past, present, or future out there in the universe, independent of his own contemplation of them, because there does not even exist a universe "out there" independent of that contemplation.

The phrase "what has been done and what has to be done" (kṛtatā-kartavyatā) in 2.1.43 also recalls the phrase, "establishing the conclusion that is to be established" (sādhya-sādhanam) in the definition of comparison in 1.1.6, and that sets up the next topic in the series, comparison.

Comparison

अत्यन्तप्रमायवैरदमेशसाधारणादुपपमानासदिः। प्रसिद्धसाधारणादुपपमानसिद्धे:यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः।

(2.1.44) atyanta-prāya-ekadeśa-sādharmyāt (abl. because) utterly – prominent – single individual – conformity to dharma upamāna-asiddhiḥ comparison – no proof (2.1.45) prasiddha-sādharmyāt (abl. coming from) well-known by all – conformity with dharma upamāna-siddheḥ (abl. because) comparison – proof // yathā-ukta-doṣa-anupapattiḥ previous assertion – false – failure (2.1.46) pratyakṣeṇa (inst. by) direct perception apratyakṣa-siddheḥ (gen. of) without direct perception – proof

3.5 (To the objection:) that there is no (valid) proof by our comparison (defined in 1.1.6), because it is (rather) the conformity to dharma on the part of single individuals that is utterly prominent (in society); that since the proof by comparison must come from our conformity with the dharma that is well-known by all, there is no evidence of fault in that which has been declared (smṛti, law), for the proof of the unperceived (dharma) must be by perception of those (single individuals).
(2.1.47) na no apratyakṣe _gavaye_ (loc. abs. in the case of) unperceived – ox "pramāṇa-artham validation – meaning upamānasya (gen. of) comparison paśyāmaḥ (1st.pl.present) we see (actual verbs are rare in the Darshanas. This is meant to stand out.) (2.1.48) tathā that way _iti_ saying // upasamīhārāt (abl. by) conclusion upamāna-siddheḥ (abl. because) comparison – affirmation na not avīśeṣaḥ no difference, the same thing (2.1.49) śabdāḥ testimony anumānam inference arthasya (gen.) an object's anupalabdheḥ (abl. resulting from) lack of observation anumeyatvāt (abl. because) its having to be inferred

3.6 (The reply is:) There is _no_ saying (testimony)—in the case of some unperceived ox (for example)—that "the meaning of the validation of comparison is that we (all) see it that way". It is not the same thing, because the (true) affirmation by comparison _is_ by that conclusion (of 1.1.6). That testimony (about the ox) is an inference, because a thing's having to be inferred results from the lack of actual observation of it.

This statement makes the transition from the discussion on inference and comparison to the discussion on testimony. The idea that "we all" would see an ox in the same way is a solid inference, but only within the paradigm of robotic human beings, each with an identical sensory apparatus. On the other hand, for one who considers his awareness to exist independently of the robot paradigm, the assumption that another person has the identical experience or memory of an ox, for example, indicated by his use of the words "brown ox", is not so solid. For him it is a matter of the experience _itself_, in the present, as opposed to the subsequent labeling, explanation, and prediction of experience. He could just as easily imagine that, purely experientially, his "brown" is another person's "red". Now, one may say that it is a matter of wavelengths of electro-magnetic radiation, receptors in the retina, neural pathways, brain regions, etc., and it certainly is, neurologically speaking; but there is a disconnect between the neurology and the experience, just as there is a disconnect between the verbal explanation and the experience. One might object that there is no disconnect when, for example, a surgeon probes a brain a certain way and the patient reports a burning smell. Well, the patient may report the sensation, but to anyone else it is only a report, really just a memory of a story, and it falls completely within the scope of reasoned explanation, not experience.
Testimony

3.7-8 From their not having the two accounts (of life) according to our observation, and from their having a common interest in the teaching of authorities, due to their own kinship with them, we know this community of belief in a purpose deriving from the word (Veda). Because of (their) lack of observation based on our means of validation, (and) because of (our) lack of observation of their satisfying (the gods), splitting (the wood), and burning (the sacrifice), there exists no kinship (between us). There is no denying (our premise) just by persevering in that (ritual) purpose of the 'word'.

(2.1.50) upalabdheḥ (abl. according to) observation a-dvi-pravṛtti-tvāt (abl. known from) not – two – accounts – their having (2.1.51) sambandhāt (abl. due to) kinship ca and (2.1.52 ?) āpta-upadeśa-sāmarthyāt (abl. known from) authorities – teaching – their having a common interest / śabdāt (abl. taken from) testimony artha-sampratyayāḥ purpose – community of belief (2.1.53) pramāṇataḥ (tasil based on) means of validation anupalabdheḥ (abl. because) lack of observation (2.1.54) pūraṇa-pradāha-pāṭana-anupalabdheḥ (abl. just because) satisfying – splitting – burning sambandha-abhāvaḥ kinship – not existing (2.1.55) śabda-artha-vyavasthānāt (abl. just by) testimony – purpose – persevering apratiṣedhāḥ no denying (refers to our premise, see 1.2.14, 2.12-14)

(2.1.56) na not sāmayikatvāt (abl. deriving from) being according to formal custom, ordination by tradition / śabda-artha-sampratyayasya (gen. on the part of) word – purpose – community of belief (2.1.57) jāti-viśeṣe (loc. regarding) birth-rank – distinguished ca indeed aniymāt (abl. because) no rule (2.1.58) tat-aprāmāyam their – lack of authority anṛta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doṣebhyaḥ (abl. because of) untruth – absurdity – redundancy – faults
3.9 That (class kinship) does not derive from any ordination by (Vedic) tradition on the part of that community of belief in that (ritual) purpose of the 'word', indeed because there is (actually) no such rule (in the Veda) regarding their distinguished birth-rank. Their lack of authority is due to the faults of that untruth, of absurdity, and of tautology.

The tautology is their proof of the validity of the karmic caste system merely by pointing out the existence of people of various castes.

***

न कर्मकर्तुसाधनवैणियाः। अभ्युपेत्य कार्तवेदेऽदोषवचनाः। अनुवादोपपत्तेऽश्र। वाकविभागस्य चार्याध्रणाः।

(2.1.59) na not karma-kartr-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt (abl. known by) rite – performer – way – unvirtuous (2.1.60) abhyupetya having agreed on // kāla-bhede (loc. regarding) time – division doṣa-vacanāt (abl. known by) false statement (2.1.61) anuvāda-upapattēḥ (abl. known by) explanation – evidence ca and (2.1.62) vākya-vibhāgasya (gen. of) spoken words – distribution (see pravibhāga YD 7.3 JW) ca indeed artha-grahaṇāt (abl. by) meaning – personal apprehension

3.10 Those (faults) are not known by anything unvirtuous in their way of 'performer and rite' – (both sides) having agreed on that. They are known by the (earlier 2.1.12-15a) false statement regarding the division of time (see also SD 2.5-9 on time), known by the evidence of our explanation of that (2.1.15b-19), and by personal apprehension of the meaning of distributing that ('word') into recited words.

Time and word distribution are also treated together in YD 3.16-17 (7.1-3 JW).

विध्यार्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगाः। विधिविर्धायकः। स्तुतिनिन्द्रा परस्कृतिः पुराकल्प इत्यार्थवादः। विधिविहितस्यानुवादवचनमनुवादः।

(2.1.63) vidhi- arthavāda- anuvāda-vacana -viniyogāt (abl. by) injunction – analysis of meaning, explanation – statement by reiteration – application (2.1.64) vidhiḥ injunction vidhāyakaḥ containing injunction (2.1.65) stutiḥ praise nindā reproach parakṛtiḥ action of another, example purā-kalpaḥ "(in) the olden time", legend iti these arthavādaḥ explanation of the meaning (2.1.66) vidhi- vihitasya (gen. of) injunction – ordered anuvacanam rephrasing anuvādaḥ reiteration
3.11 By their application of the (Vedic) "vidhi", "arthavāda" (explanation), and "anuvāda": the vidhi contains the injunction; the arthavāda is the praise and reproach (of the smṛti), example, and legend; and the anuvāda is a rephrasing of what has been ordered by the injunction.

This obliquely recalls the three main elements of the syllogism in terms of three different kinds of Vedic texts. Injunction represents the initial assertion or theory, analysis represents the reason, and rephrasing represents the conclusion.

नानुवादपरनुतत्त्वार्थविचित्र: शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्ते:। शीघ्रतरागमनोपदेशवद्यासारांविचित्रे:।

(मन्त्रायुक्तप्रामाण्यचतुष्टाब्धिसारी| Vb)

(2.1.67) na no anuvāda-punaruktyoḥ (loc. between) explanation – redundancy viśeṣaḥ difference šabda-abhyāsa-upapatteḥ (abl. based on) words – repetition – evidence (2.1.68) sīghratarā-gamana-upadesavat (vatup ind. having) faster – going – teaching abhyaśāt (abl. because) repetition na not avīṣeṣaḥ no difference, the same (2.1.69) mantra-ayurveda-prāmāṇyavat (vati like) verses – exposition on medical science – authority ca and tat-prāmāṇyam whose – authority āpta-prāmāṇyāt (abl. deriving from) experts – authority

3.12 Based on the evidence of the (mere) repetition of the words, there would be no difference between their explanation and redundancy, but there is some difference because their repetition has the (smṛti’s) teaching of going more quickly (see 3.2.29) and it is like the authority of the mantras of the Ayurveda, whose authority derives from the authority of experts.

न चतुष्ट्रैर्थप्रशस्तिसाम्भवाभावार्थप्रस्तावः। शब्द ऐतिहासिकार्थान्तरभावात् अनुमाने-र्थार्थप्रशस्तिसाम्भवाभावान्तरभावार्थप्रशस्तिप्रतिपेधः।

(2.2.1) na not the case catuṣṭvam there being four aitihya – arthāpatti-sambhava – abhāva-prāmāṇyāt (abl. by) tradition – "arriving at a meaning", interpretation – (ifc) derived from – devoid of authority (a bahuvrīhi compound) (2.2.2) šabde (loc. in) testimony aitihya -an-artha-antara-bhāvāt (abl. just because) oral tradition – lack of – meaning – alternate – view / anumāne (loc. with regard to) inference arthāpatti-sambhava – abhāva-an-artha-antara-bhāvāt (abl. just because) interpretation – (ifc) derived from – devoid (=abhāva-prāmānya 2.2.1 and 2.2.7) – lack of – meaning – alternate – view ca and apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
3.13 There being four (expositions), by (the inclusion of) that one which is devoid of that (Vedic) authority (the smṛti), derived from their interpretation of the oral tradition (of the three 2.1.63), is not the case. There is no denying (our premise) just because there is no (mention of our) view with an alternate meaning in the word (itself), and just because there is no (mention of our) view with an alternate meaning in the one that is devoid (of authority, the smṛti), derived from their interpretation (of the word).

अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात्। अनौपचारिकत्वपरत्यभिमानात्। प्रतिवेदाप्रमाणायः
चौकान्तिकत्वात्। तत्प्रामाण्येवा नार्थप्रचार्यप्रामाण्यम्।

(2.2.3) arthāpattiḥ interpretation apramāṇam without authority anaikāntikatvāt (abl. for) not being only one way (2.2.4) anarthāpattau (loc. against) misinterpretation arthāpatti-abhimānāt (abl. on the basis of) interpretation – ego involvement (2.2.5) pratiṣedha-aprāmāṇyam denial – no authority ca moreover anaikāntikatvāt (abl. since) not being only one way (2.2.6) tat-prāmāṇye (loc. if) such – authority vā on the other hand na not arthāpatti-aprāmāṇyam interpretation – lacking authority

3.14 That is an interpretation without any authority, for there is not just that one way. Moreover, since there is not just the one way, there should be no authority to deny on the basis of an ego involvement against some 'misinterpretation'. If, on the other hand, one had the authority for such (a denial), one's interpretation would not lack authority.

Prameya

नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः। लक्षितेत्तलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धेः।

असन्त्यथे नाभाव इति चेत्

(2.2.7) na no abhāva-prāmāṇyam devoid of authority (The referent of abhāva is anaikāntikatva in 2.2.5.) prameya-(gen.)-asiddheḥ (abl. just because) to be validated – no affirmation (2.2.8) lakṣiteṣu (loc. pl. when) things indicated (Theses plural terms usually refer to people.) alaśaṇa-lakṣitatvāt (abl. because) without indication – the way of being indicated alaśitānām (gen. "of") (ref. is siddhi) things not indicated // tat such prameya-siddhiḥ to be validated – proof (2.2.9) asati_arthe (loc. abs. given that when) not actually so – meaning na it does not mean abhāvaḥ doesn't exist iti_cet to the objection
3.15 To the objection that it is not 'devoid of authority' just because there is no affirmation of our prameya; that that (affirmation) of all those (souls) that are not (perceptually) indicated happens when they are indicated, because that is the way of being indicated for something having no (sensory) indication; that that is the affirmation of prameya, given that when something is not actually so (indicated), that doesn't mean it doesn't exist, ...

नन्निः।तसतदरलसकति।तत्सिद्धेहुः।नन्निः।न लकणमावससतमाप

(2.2.9 cont.) na no such thing anya-lakṣaṇa-upapatteḥ (abl. known by) different – indication – evidence (2.2.10) tat it is thus siddheḥ (abl. because) proof alaksīteṣu (loc. with) not indicated ahetuḥ grounds (2.2.11) na not lakṣaṇa-avasthita-apekṣā-siddheḥ (abl. known by) indicator – stationed or abiding in – considering – proof (2.2.12) prāṅc-utpatteḥ (gen. of) prior – coming into existence, birth abhāva-upapatteḥ (abl. because) not existing, empty – evidence ca and

3.16 (The reply is:) No such (non-indicated) thing is known by evidence that indicates a different thing. With things that are not (immediately) indicated, (saying) 'it is thus because that (indication) is the proof', is no grounds. That (soul) cannot be known by some (tautological) proof by considering how it is 'stationed' in its indicator (body), and by some empty evidence of a prior-to-birth state. (as opposed to constancy)

आदिमत्त्वदैन्तिन्द्रियकल्पतत्रत्वकवर्त्तच। न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वाक्लिष्ठेष्वणित्यवर्त्तचाच।

(2.2.13) ādimattvāt (abl. w/upacāra; compared to) "the having a beginning", origination aindriyakatvāt (abl. from) a state consisting of the powers of sense kṛtakavat (vatup ind.) having artificiality upacārāt (abl. ind.) taken figuratively ca and (2.2.14) na not ghaṭa-abhāva-sāmānya-nityatvāt (abl. from) pot, vessel – in the absence of – universal – constant state // nityeṣu_api (loc. pl. w/api) even though they remain constant (The referent must be plural. Indriyas fits well.) anityavat (vatup ind.) having inconstancy upacārāt (abl. ind.) figuratively ca and
3.17 That (indicator) has an artificial nature and is taken as a figure, compared to our origination (also "birth") which arises out of a state consisting (only) of the powers of sense, not out of any (supposed) constant state of that (soul) which is universally agreed to, (even) in the absence of that 'vessel' (body). Even while those (powers of sense) remain constant, that (physical birth) has an inconstant nature and is taken as a figure.

He is not saying that one is right and the other wrong, but that there are two complementary definitions of "origination" or "birth" in this teaching. Neither of these, however, includes the doctrines of karma, reincarnation, or caste.

तत्त्वभक्तयोर्नात्तत्वयो विभागात् अव्यभिचरः।संतानानुमानविशेषणात्। कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्दनिमित्तायात्।

(2.2.15) tattva-bhāktayoh (loc. dual; when considering) essence – "fed", subservient, secondary nānātvasya (gen. of) manifoldness vibhāgāt (abl. because) disjunction avyabhicāraḥ not deviating (2.2.16) saṁtāna-anumāna-viśeṣanāt (abl. since) continuous – inference – the act of distinguishing (2.2.17) kāraṇa-dravyasya (gen. of) cause – physical pradeśa-śabdena (inst. by way of) "pointing-out", expository – speech abhidhānāt (abl. for) telling, utterance

3.18 Because there is a disjunction of that manifoldness (of soul vessels) when considering the essential vs. the secondary, we are not really deviating (from the scholarly stance cf. 1.2.2-4), since we are just distinguishing between that continuous thing (the essence) and that inference (the secondary), for (after all) this very (audible) utterance (like the Veda) comes by way of an expository speech whose cause is physical. (cf. 2.1.6-7 and BU I. 3.23.)

All the Darśana authors remind us that when we consider the ideas of solipsism and subjective idealism, we momentarily leave behind the reality of bodies and souls, but we do not dismiss or deviate from the normal view of life. For those of us who wish to examine both, the particle-first reality of science—though reliable within itself as an explanation of physical causes and effects and as tool for prediction of physical events—is not enough to answer our questions about the nature of consciousness. Like religious people, we accept two incompatible realities. Science is based on observation and inference, but we distinguish a separate reality that begins with our continuous consciousness, which is the foundation of both our observation and our inference.
Chapter Four - Hearing the Continuous Sound

प्रागुक्तधारणातनुपलब्ध्यातिरिण्यनुपलब्ध्येकः। तदनुपलब्ध्यातनुपलब्धमात्वादावरणोपपत्ति।।
अनुपलब्धमात्यनुपलब्धिनुपलब्ध्याः।

(2.2.18) prāk-(prāṃc)-uccāraṇāt (abl. developing from) first, just prior – audible pronunciation, sounding audibly anupalabdheḥ (abl. stemming from) failure to observe āvaraṇa-ādi-anupalabdheḥ (abl. from) concealing – at the beginning – failure to observe ca and (2.2.19) tat-anupalabdheḥ (abl. arising from) that (The referent is saṁtāna 2.2.16) – failure to observe anupalambhāt (abl. coming from) lack of recognition āvaraṇa-upapattiḥ concealing – evidence (2.2.20a) anupalambhāt (abl. because) lack of recognition api indeed anupalabdhi-sat-bhāva-vat (vati like, as if) failure to observe – primary reality

4.1 There is evidence of a concealing effect of that (speech), which comes from a certain lack of recognition that arises from failure to observe that (continuous essence), stemming from the failure to observe which develops from its first emergence into audible pronunciation, and from the failure to observe the concealing effect itself, at the beginning (of language). Indeed, because of that lack of recognition, it's as if that (state of) failure to observe (the continuous) were the primary reality.

नावरणातनुपलव्यक्तादावरणोपपत्ति। अनुपलब्धमात्यनुपलब्ध्यातिरिण्यनुपलब्ध्येकः। अस्पश्तात। न कर्मानिन्यत्वात।

2.2.20b) na not āvaraṇa-anupapattiḥ concealing – lack of evidence anupalambhāt (abl. just because) failing to recognize (2.2.21) anupalambha-ātmakatvāt (abl. for) non-recognition – (ifc) being the very nature of anupalabdheḥ (abl. due to) failure to observe ahetuḥ lack of grounds for knowledge (2.2.22) asparśatvāt (abl. from) being without a feel for it (2.2.23) na not karma-anityatvāt (abl. from) proper religious and civil acts – inconstancy

4.2 It's not that there is no evidence of the concealing effect, just because one may fail to recognize it. The lack of grounds for knowledge is due to the failure to observe (the continuous), for that (failure) is the very nature of the failure to recognize. It results from not having the feel of it, not from inconstancy in one's karmas.
4.3 Nor does that (grounds for knowledge) come from constancy of the minutiae (of karmas and recitations), for that is just handed down by tradition. That (constancy) of not observing the inner domain of that (feel), lacks our grounds for knowledge. There is no denying (our premise) just by that teaching. Given that there are both wings (in our premise), there is no denying it by the teaching of one or the other.

[(2.2.29) abhyāsāt* (2.2.30) na neither anyatve_api (loc. even though) its being the other (side) abhyāsasya (gen. of) repetition (ref=apraṭiṣedhaḥ) upacārāt (abl. because) a metaphor or figure (2.2.31) "anyat (that) other anyasmāt (abl. of comparison w/anyatva; than) the other anyatvāt (abl. because) there being nothing other than (w/abl.) ananyatvaḥ not something other iti to say (w/quotes) anyatā-abhāvaḥ otherness – missing the existence (2.2.32) tat-abhāve (loc.) that – (in. loc.) without the existence na_asti (w/loc.) there could be no ananyatā non-otherness tayoḥ (loc. dual; between) the two itaretara-apekṣā- siddheḥ (abl. for) one against the other – considering – proof]

4.4 Neither can there be that (denial) of repetition (of words), even considering its being the other (side), because that (repetition) is a figure (of the continuous). To say "that 'other' (of which you speak) is not something other, because of there being nothing other than that (Vedic) other," misses the existence of otherness (altogether) and without the existence of that, there could be no 'non-otherness' (sameness) between the two (sides), for the proof of that (sameness) is (also) by considering one side vs. the other. (cf 2.1.41).
It is a reciprocating consideration of the two complementary world views (saṁyama, as described in the Yoga) that constitutes the completeness of the knowledge, not just consideration of one side or the other exclusively.

* The commenter offers a wry observation on the first part of this convoluted statement by saying: "(Because of his own repetition, ..." I agree. The author first mentions abhyāsa (repetition) in 2.1.68, but he demonstrates the idea of repetition of words by expanding it to almost comic proportions, for example: pramāṇa/ prameya and siddhi in 2.1.16-20, arthāpatti in 2.2-6, lakṣana/ita in 2.2.7-11, anupalabdh/lambh in 2.2.18-21, and anyat here.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धे:। अवश्ववकारणानुपलब्धे: सततव्यवणप्रसङ्ग:। उपलभ्यमाने
चानुपलब्धेयसतत्वादनपदेषा:।

(2.2.33) vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. ind.) completely doing away with – cause, reason – without observing (2.2.34) aśravaṇa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. ind.) not hearing the Veda (śravaṇa=śruti here) – cause, reason – not observing satata-śravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ the continuous – hearing – occupation with (2.2.35) upalabhya-māne (loc. considering) comprehensible – considering ca and again anupalabdheḥ (abl. just because) not observing asat-tvāt (abl. ind. that) its not being real anapadesāḥ no pointing out

4.5 (So) without observing any cause for not hearing the Veda, without observing any cause for doing away with it, we are occupied with hearing the continuous, and again (see also 2.2.20b), considering that it can be comprehended, there is no pointing out that it isn't real just because one doesn't observe it.

पाणिनिमित्तप्रक्षेपाच्छव्यदामावत नातुपलब्धि:। विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेयव्यवस्थाने तत्त्रित्य-त्वप्रसङ्ग:। अस्पशीत्वादप्रति:।

(2.2.36) pāṇi-nimitta-praśleṣāt (abl. w/nimitta caused by) hands – cause – clapping śabda-abhāve (loc. even in) sound – absence na not anupalabdhīḥ without observation (2.2.37) vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) doing away with – cause, reason – not observing ca (w/neg.) either avasthāne (loc. even within) life circumstance tat-nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ that (=satata-śravaṇa 2.2.34) – constancy – occupation with (2.2.38) asparśatvāt (abl. just because) not having the feel of apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.6 Even in the absence of any sound caused by (e.g.) clapping the hands, we are still not without observation of that (continuous sound). Since (however) we do not observe any cause for doing away with that (caused sound) either, the occupation with the constancy of that (continuous sound) must be within our circumstance (the rite). There is no denying (our premise) just because one does not have the feel (of the continuous).

The word for life-circumstance also means fixity or steadiness in living life the way one is supposed to. In this lesson the author also points out two conflicting notions of constancy (nityatva). He rejects the constancy of the minute atoms and of the minutiae of Vedic karmas (aṇu-nityatva 2.2.23 and karma-nityatva 2.2.24) in favor of hearing or feeling (very closely related in consciousness) the constancy of the prime sound (satata-śravaṇa-nityatva (2.2.34 and 2.2.37).

Conflicting definitions of "transformation"

विभक्त्यन्तरयोपपत्ति

म　श्च सममास

म　शयोपद

म　शमात

सशयन्निः। प्ररवृसतसववववृदलौ सवरमारसववववृद

म　न्निः।

न्य

तनसममासधिरयोपलब्धि

म　सवरमारमाणमामह

म　तम

म　न्निः।

(2.2.39) vibhakti-antara-upapatteḥ (abl. because) coming apart – inner – becoming evident ca moreover samāse (loc. in) coming together (2.2.40) vikārāt (abl. about) transformation eśa-upadeśāt (abl. from) this (stands out) – teaching saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (2.2.41) prakṛti-vivṛddheḥ (loc. as) prime originator – expansion vikāra-vivṛddhau (abl. for) transformation – expansion (2.2.42) nyūna-sama-adhika-upalabdheḥ (abl. known by) deficient – balanced – excessive – observing vikārāṇām (gen. of) transformations ahetuḥ not grounds

4.7 Moreover, because in the coming together of that (circumstance) an inner coming apart becomes evident, uncertainty arises from this our teaching, for (in this teaching) there is the expansion of the transformation (of the continuous) as the expansion of the prime originator (prakṛti). Our grounds for knowledge is not that of the 'transformations' (pl. =incarnations) that are known by observing the deficient vs. the balanced vs. the excessive (the three guṇas: tamas, sattva, and rajas; also three levels of incarnation).

The continuous sound is linked with the ether, which is always associated with mahat. Mahat's expansion and transformation is through his prakṛti aspect. (see SD)
4.8 (To the objection) that our (twofold) standard is not the way, for on the part of something that is clearly twofold, there can be no existence of our (clearly singular) grounds for knowledge; that it is not (the way), because there would be a diversity of our 'transformation' (by expansion of the prime originator, prakṛti) on the part of (many) 'prime originators' who are unequal; that there is (instead) a diversity of transformations of people of various castes, just as there is inequality in the diversity of physical things.

4.9 (The reply is:) No, because our dharma doesn't work as that (kind of) transformation, because it is without that recurrence (reincarnation) held by the authorities on transformation. That is not our grounds, just because the (theory of) recurrence belongs to people of good caste and their like, for it (our grounds) lacks the exclusion of those transformations (lower castes), which is the view of the good caste.
(2.2.50) \([\text{varṇatva-avyatirekāt} \text{ varṇa-vikārāṇām apratiṣedhaḥ}\) (copied from 2.2.51) sāmānyavatāḥ dharma-yogaḥ / na sāmānyasya; (Regarding this passage,) the yoga of dharma results from its universality, but there is no such (yoga) of the universal itself.) nityatve (loc. in the case of, with) constancy avikārāt ("vikārāt" in Vb) (abl. since) no transformation / anityatve (loc.) without constancy ca and anavasthānāt (abl. since) no steadiness (2.2.51) nityānām (gen.pl. of) those who are constant (Finding this word in the plural confirms that it is not the usual "eternal"., but "constant in" or "devoted to").

ati-indriyatvāt (abl. due to) beyond their powers of sense tat-dharma-vikalpāt (abl. since) their – duty – diversity ca (connecting a positive term to the previous two negative terms) and yet / varṇatva-avyatirekāt (abl. just because) caste system – exclusion varṇa-vikārāṇām (gen. of) caste – transformations apratiṣedhaḥ no denying

4.10 1.) Since there is no such (recurring) transformation with our constancy (of the continuous sound 2.2.37), and 2.) since there is no steadiness without that constancy, and yet 3.) since, on the part of those who remain constant (in their duty 2.2.24) due to that (continuous sound) being beyond their power of sense, there is a diversity of roles; (we say) there is no denying (our premise) just because there is exclusion of those transformations of (lower) caste on the part of the caste system.

(2.2.52) anavasthāyitve (loc. while) not being steady in life circumstance ca as well varṇa-upalabdhivat (vati like) caste – observing // tat thus, in that way vikāra-upapattīḥ transformation – evidence (2.2.53) vikāra-dharmitve (loc. in) transformation – observing dharma nityatva-abhāvāt (abl. by) constancy – empty kāla-antare (loc. across) time – interval vikāra-upapatteḥ (abl. by) transformation – evidence ca and apratiṣedhaḥ no denying
4.11 It is like observing (the reality of) caste, while not also having to be steady in that life circumstance. Such is our evidence for transformation. There is no denying (our premise) by their empty constancy in observing a dharma of (karmic) transformation, and by their evidence of transformation across a period of time.

The Rule of Prakṛti

(2.2.54) prakṛti-aniyamāt (abl. just because) prime originator – no rule (See aniyamāt 2.1.57, also referring to caste.) varṇa-vikārāṇām (gen. pl. of) caste – transformations (2.2.55) aniyame (loc. where) no rule niyamāt (abl. since) rule na it is not the case aniyamaḥ no rule (2.2.56) niyama-aniyama-virodhāt (abl. by) rule – no rule – logical contradiction aniyame (loc. where) no rule niyamāt (abl. by) rule ca w/neg. nor apratiṣedhāḥ no denying

4.12 Just because there is no rule (definition) of a prime originator of transformations by caste, since that is a rule (made up) where there is no rule (3.9), it is not the case that there is no rule (of prakṛti) at all. There is no denying (our premise) by a (seeming) logical contradiction between their rule and what is not that rule, nor by (dictating) a rule where there is no rule.

Prakṛti (the three guṇas) remains the underlying subject right through to 3.1.27. In this comparison he demonstrates again the idea of repetition of words, this time by repeating the word "rule" eight times. I can't say that I understand what he hoped to accomplish with this awkward technique.

(2.2.57) guṇa-antara-āpatti -(abl.)- upamarda-hrāsa – vṛddhi -(gen.)- leśa - (inst.)- śleṣebhyaḥ (abl. pl. known through) guṇas (clearly plural in the context of prakṛti) – other kind – happening, becoming, changing into – crushing decrease – increase – a mere trace amount – double meanings, alternate meanings tu instead (enclitic, referring to the whole clause) vikāra-upapatteḥ (abl. by) transformations – evidence varṇa-vikāraḥ caste – transformation (2.2.58) te (pl.) these (guṇas) (remember the context!) vibhakti-antāḥ partitions – ends (Reading
this compound as "grammatical terminations", because of its proximity to "padam" is tempting but incorrect. The larger context must be adhered to, with "padam" recognized as part of the interpolation with tadarthe. cf. interpolation of pada-arthaḥ in 2.2.66.) // padam tat-arthe; where the meaning is that (vibhakti-antāḥ), that (guṇa) is the word for it. Vb vyakti-ākṛti-jāti-saṁnidhau (loc. as) individual – physical form – birth or birth-rank – (ifc) in the context of upacārāt (abl. ind.) meant figuratively saṁśayaḥ uncertainty

4.13 Transformation by caste (personal quality), according to our evidence of transformation (of prakṛti see 2.2.41), is known instead through the alternate meanings that have only a trace of the crushing decrease (tamas) and the increase (rajas) that are known by the 'becoming' that happens on the part of that other kind of guṇas (the threefold). (See "abounding in sattva..." SD 12.10.) There is the uncertainty that these (guṇas) are the boundaries of the (three) partitions (by caste cf SD 12.10), vs. the term (guṇa) taken figuratively as in the context of our birth of the physical form of the individual.

According to the author's thesis, the transformation or "becoming" of one's personal quality from the prime originator (prakṛti) aspect happens when the balance of the three guṇas is disturbed. The ideal state of this is one where sattva predominates and rajas and tamas are diminished to a trace amount. The opponent's three, on the other hand, delineate three dharmic social strata representing the personal qualities of dullness, passion, and purity.

या शब्दसमूहांगपरिग्रहसंस्कृत्यावृद्धिपथवर्णसंसानुवन्धानां व्यक्तिपथवार्थिनि:। न
tदन्वस्थानात॥

(2.2.60) yā (fem.) whoever (referring to the fem. vyakti) śabda-samūha – tyāga – parigraha – saṁkhya-vṛddhi – upacaya-varṇa-samāsa – anubandhānām (gen. plural; of the various) Vedic testimony – community – abandoning or giving away – possessing wealth or receiving gifts – reckoning – increase – growing – caste – aggregation – representatives vyaktai (loc. w/yā) whoever the individual // upacārāt (abl. known by) figure vyaktiḥ (manifestation of) an individual (2.2.61) na no tat such anavasthānāt (abl. arising out of) absence of life circumstance
4.14 (But) whoever the individual is—of the various representatives of the aggregation of castes growing (in their dharma) with their increase reckoned in the collective of the (Vedic) 'word' (priests), in giving (food) (rulers), or in receiving it (renunciants)—that individual manifestation is known by the figure (of the continuous; see 2.2.30). No such (manifestation) arises out of the absence of any life circumstance (between incarnations).

Out of the various castes and stages of human life, he mentions only the "good" ones—priest, ruler, and renunciant—referring to them by descriptions of their acts, which was a very common technique for the ancient authors. The following material reinforces these three examples, even explicitly naming two of the particular life-circumstances. Interestingly, the words tyāga and parigraha can both have double meanings here. Tyāga means either abandoning like a renunciant, or giving away like a wealthy donor. Similarly, parigraha can mean either the possession of wealth, family, and power, or "taking", as in receiving donations.

सहचरणस्थानातःदर्श्यत्मानधारणसामीयोगसाधनाधिपत्येथ्यो ब्राह्मणमाष्ट्रकराजः
सतुचन्दनगण्डकाशात्काशपुरुषेः

(2.2.62) saha-caraṇa-sthāna-tādārthya — vṛttamāna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya —
yoga-sādhanā-ādhīpatyebhyaḥ (abl. pl. known by) (Each three-word subcompound ends with a syaṅ bhāvārtha termination. Long compounds in close proximity often have a respective correspondence of their internal subcompounds.)
collective-endeavor (cf samūha 2.2.60) — taking a stance — having the purpose of — life (See vartamāna MW. He has already used that variation to mean "the present". cf 2.1.39-42) — maintaining — mukti of being near the divinity — union — way of accomplishing — supremacy, sovereignty, power brāhmaṇa-maṇḍa-kaṭa —
rāja-saktu-candana — gaṅgā-śaṭaka-anna-puruṣeṣu (loc. referring to) brahmin — (sacrificial?) platform — "twist of straw" (MW) (the straw brand for transferring fire from the gārhapatya to the āhavanīya?), a straw mat or screen (possibly referring to the śūrpa, which is a winnowing basket for rice, mentioned in connection with the new and full moon sacrifice in Ś.Br. I. — king, ruler — grain — sandalwood — Ganges — strip of cloth (loincloth?) — "food man", the food-receiving man of 2.2.60, the renunciant
4.15 They are known (rather) by having the purpose of taking a stance in the collective (brahminical) endeavor, or by being near to a divinity by maintaining the life (of the kingdom), or by supremacy in the way of Yoga; where those (three descriptions) refer to the priest with the twist of straw and the platform, the ruler with grain and sandalwood, and the loinclothed 'food man' (food-receiving man, renunciant, 2.2.60) on the Ganges (respectively).

अतद्वावेश्यं तत्तःपूष्ठ:। आच्छादितस्तद्याविश्वास्वस्थानसिद्ध:। व्यक्तियाकृतियुक्तेषु। प्रसारत्योक्ष्यादां जम्वलके जाति:।

atat-bhāve_api (loc. w/api even though) not that – existence tat that (vs. atat) upacāraḥ figure (2.2.63) ākṛtiḥ form tat-apekṣatvāt (abl. because) that – its being considered sattva-vyavasthāna-siddheḥ (abl. because) purity – persevering – affirmation (2.2.64) vyakti-ākṛti-yukte_api (loc. w/api; even though) individual – manifestation of – linking aprasaṅgāt (abl. ind.) without occupation (w/gen.) prokṣaṇādīnām (gen.) consecration by sprinkling water – etc. mṛd-gavake (loc. as it would be for) clay – cow figurine jātiḥ birth rank

4.16 Even though one's existence is not that, one's figure is that. It is one's (outer) form, because that is what one considers it to be, because the affirmation of that (existence) is known by perseverance in (the constant) sattva (vs. the decrease and increase of tamas and rajas. cf. 2.2.57). And even though one is linked with his manifestation as an individual (body), it is his 'birth rank' only as that would be so for a clay cow figurine, being unoccupied with any rites of consecration etc. (for that).

नाकृतिययाकृतियाविश्वास्वस्थानसिद्ध:। आच्छादितस्तद्याविश्वास्वस्थानसिद्ध:। व्यक्तियाकृतियुक्तेषु। प्रसारत्योक्ष्यादां जम्वलके जाति:।

(2.2.65) na not so ākṛti-vyakti-apekṣatvāt (abl. because) manifestation – individual – being considered // jāti-abhivyakteḥ (abl. since) birth rank – appearance (2.2.66) vyakti-ākṛti-jātayaḥ individuals – manifestation – birth ranks tu but, rather pada-arthaḥ word, term – meaning, referring to (2.2.67) vyaktiḥ individual guṇa-viśeṣa-aśrayaḥ qualities – distinct, unequal – seat mūrtiḥ the physical body (f.) (2.2.68) ākṛtiḥ manifestation jāti-liṅga-ākhyā birth rank – indicator – called
4.17 (To the objection) that it is not so, because of that manifestation being considered as a single individual, and the meaning of the term (guṇas) here referring rather to the (three) birth-ranks of the manifestation of single individuals, since they do appear through birth-rank, and that the single individual that is that body, the manifestation that is called the indicator of his birth-rank is the seat of those distinct (unequal) guṇas (levels of caste).

Though the word mūrti can mean any physical form, they are talking specifically about the form of a person and the sight of one's own body and those of others sorted into three layers of human worth, vs. the purity, passion, or crushing that are felt internally by a person, but not shared.

4.18 (The reply is:) One's true birth consists of the (three) equal (balanced) forces (of prakṛti, the three guṇas), through a personal apprehension that has the same meaning, but through sight and feel, not through perseverance in the physical sphere. There is no denying (our premise) just by the primary reality of the self being known by perseverance in that (physical sphere) alone.

Chapter Five -Body and Soul

(3.1.4) śarīra-dāhe (loc. when) body – burning pātaka-abhāvāt (abl. since) causing to fall away or die – no real existence, no substance (3.1.5) tat-abhāvāh that – no substance // sātmaka-pradāhe_api (loc. w/api even though) having a soul or self (see sātman MW) – burning away tat-nityatvāt (abl. because) its –
being constant or eternal (3.1.6) na it does not kārya-āśraya-kartṛ-vadhāt (abl. caused by) made, done, performed – seat – maker, creator – killing or destruction of a person (3.1.7) savya-dṛṣṭasya (gen. of) on the left (ibc) – what is seen itareṇa (instr. by) the other prayabhijānānāt (abl. for) recognition

5.1 Since there is no substance in (the notion of) its (the self) falling away when the physical body is burned, there is (also) no substance in that (perseverance). Because of its being eternal, even though the thing that (supposedly) 'has' a soul burns away, such (a burning) is not caused by the creator's act of destroying the seat (the body) of the performed (karma), for the recognition of what is seen by the left (eye, the self) must be the same by means of the other (eye, the creator).

He has mentioned both the individual self or "soul", and the creator. By left and right he is referring to the eyes as symbols of the two complementary "views" of reality. The creator is supposedly responsible for the physical world and the soul for its awareness of it. He says again that both roles belong to one and the same being, just as both eyes belong to the same face.

5.2 (What is seen) by that one (eye, the self) is not proved by a personal conviction that when separated by the bridge of the nose there are two, (but) neither is there a oneness, since that non-destruction of the second is when there is destruction of an (actual) first. That (oneness) is not our grounds for knowledge, just because we observe the whole even when the parts are destroyed; (so) there is no denying (our premise) just by the (seeming) logical contradiction of our (twofold) doctrine.
5.3 Since ours is a transformation (of prakṛti) through the inner senses (the mind), it is not the one known from the existence of the sphere that has to be memorized from the law texts. There is no denying (our premise) just by its 'actual truth' about the qualities of individual souls, and just because we do not reckon everything around as belonging to the sphere of that law.

5.4 That ('actual truth') is not the case, because the origin of all those reasons (given in the smṛti) for knowing about individual souls is in one's mind, and the awareness of this arises from the evidence of the establishment of true comprehension, on the part of one who truly comprehends, while the rule (of prakṛti see 2.2.54) as merely the partition (of castes) leaves out (that it is an) inference.
As opposed to any (supposed) mutual understanding of the (e.g.) excitement, fear, or grief of the born form, known (merely) by the (facial, bodily) expression, based on remembering what has been learned previously, the transformation of that (prakṛti) is like the transformation by the opening and closing of lotus petals and the like (an analogy for mind, see 1.1.12).

5.5 (To the objection) that it is not so, because its being hot, cold, or rainy at the time (metaphors for rajas, tamas, and sattva?) would be the real cause of those (opening and closing) transformations of the fivefold (lotus), (or) because it is (rather like) one's craving for milk, as opposed to one's being done with the habit of taking food, having died, …

The metaphor illustrates the blossoming of awareness from within vs. the outer visual indication. During the uncertainty phase, the same analogy would mean that awareness is caused by physical forces acting on or within a living physical body.
(3.1.22) **ayasaḥ** (gen.) lit. "iron's", but "iron" is more sensible **ayaskānta-abhidhigamanavat** (vati like) lodestone, magnet – going close, approaching **tattupasarpaṇam** that (*The referent is still prakṛti, the same as that of the previous "tat" in 3.1.19.) – approaching (3.1.23) **na** not **anyatra** the other way **pravṛttimahāvāt** (abl. known by) account – without substance, empty (3.1.24) **vīta-rāgarjanmā** (n.sg. of janman) gone away – passion – birth **darśanāt** (vati as) comprised of essential constituents – physical – manifestation **tattutpattiḥ** that (prakṛti) – manifestation

5.7 (The reply is:) ... *whereas* the birth of one who is freed from passion, known by seeing, is the act of approaching that (prakṛti, as sattva) like iron pulling close to a magnet, not the other way that is known by the empty account. The manifestation of that (prakṛti) exists as the manifestation of the physical sphere comprised of it's essential constituents (guṇas).

(3.1.26) **na** not **saṁkalpa-nimittatvāt** (abl. known from) mental conception – being the cause **rāga-ādīnām** (gen. of) passion – and the others (3.1.27) **parthivam** consisting of pṛthivī, organic substance, "earth" **guṇa-antara-upalabdheḥ** (abl. for) quality – inner – observation (A block of text had been mistakenly transposed here and numbered 3.1.28-30.) (3.1.31) **śruti-prāmāṇyāt** (abl. ind.) veda – accepting the authority **ca** as well as (3.1.32) **kṛṣna-sāre_sati** (loc. in) the reality of the eyeball **upalambhāt** (abl. by) comprehending

5.8 That (the body) which consists of organic substance (earth) is not known from its cause being a conception of passion and the others (the three guṇas as planes of existence), for it is the observation of the inner guṇas, *as well as* accepting the authority of śruti by comprehending it in the reality of the eyeball.
5.9 The consisting of (the three elements that are *seen* by the eyeball:) earth, water, and fire, is known by observing their (inner) guṇas. (This is the world of objects). The consisting of *four* elements is known by observing (air as well, by) inhaling and exhaling. (This world includes the human). The consisting of *five* elements is known by offerings of food, with the smell of it (earth), the moisture of it (water), the cooking of it (fire), the arranging of it (touch, air), and the space (provided for it). (This world includes the gods.)

5.10) (So,) there is uncertainty, because there is *also* a certain recognition having excluded that, (but) since it is a matter of personal apprehension as both the *great* and the *minute*, there is no such personal apprehension just through the particular (visual) drawing-in of an object by line of sight. Failure to observe that (great and minute together) is not our grounds for knowledge.
5.11 (To the objections:) that it is not the case that the lack of observation that would result from direct perception of a thing that is being inferred, constitutes 'empty' grounds for knowing it; (and) that the rule of observation is satisfied both by the division of dharmas according to physical qualities that are known from the inherence of multiplicity (of forms) in the physical (sphere), and by one's own particular form, …

5.12 (The reply is:) The observation of (human) forms and the karmas they are made to do, as a principle of 'human purpose', is just an ordering of one's senses. If one doesn't observe them, it is only like not observing the light of shooting stars at midday.

He says that in the bright daylight of immediate self-awareness, the little comings and goings of temporary lives are not that noticeable.
5.13 (To the objection) that it is not so, because one does observe them at night, since the observation of that sphere is through the aid of the lights that belong to those (souls) being borne (across the sky); that any lack of observation of them is due to there being no (bodily) manifestation of them, indeed because when there is manifestation, that is the predominant thing.

5.14 (The reply is:) There is also a personal apprehension of that which is imperceptible (by day) by seeing by line of sight the light leading from (the eyes of) nocturnal creatures. There is no denying (our premise) just because one cannot observe something obscured by a barrier, for one can observe what is screened by (e.g.) glass, (thin) cloud cover, a veil, or ... a crystal.

A tiger camouflaged in the jungle may be unseen by day, but seen at night by the light from its eyes, which is known to be reflected, not produced like starlight. He develops this theme of reflection further in 5.16, possibly referring to the scripture: BU 1.4.10 “seeing this and that (god 1.4.6), the rishi Vāmadeva affirmed 'I am the original man, and I became the god Sūrya'
5.15 (To the objection) that such (a line of sight) is the evidence of drawing-in-together, for there is no dismissing it; that since there is no obstruction of (the god) Sūrya’s line of sight to the flammable (sacrifice to him), even if there is a crystal (a human soul) in between, neither is there any (obstacle) by being devoted to one's respective dharma (of sacrificing).

आदर्शादर्शकोः प्रसादस्वाभावार्थपोपलधिविविधत्तुपलधिवः। द्वारा ततैः नियोगप्रतिच्छानुपपत्ति:।

(3.1.50) ādarśa-udakayoḥ (loc. in) mirror – water prasāda-svābhāvyāt (abl. through) clarity, serenity – state of self-existence rūpa-upalabdhitāt (vati like) form – observation tat-upalabdhiḥ him – observation (3.1.51) drṣṭa-anumitānām (gen. pl. of things) learned – inferred niyoga-pratīṣedha-anupapattiḥ necessity – denial – unfitting, doesn't work

5.16 (The reply is:) The observation of him (Sūrya) is like the observation of one's form (reflected like 3.1.44) in a mirror or water, through the state of self-existence in its clarity, (so indeed) it doesn't work to deny the necessity of (all) the things that are learned and inferred (from scripture, e.g., BU 1.4.10.)

स्थानान्यचे नानात्वादव्यविदानास्थानत्वाच संदर्भ:। त्वगद्यनिष्करकात। (नन्द्र्यान्तराध्यानुपलधिवः। Vb)

(3.1.52) sthāna-anyatve (loc. in) stance – the other nāṇātvāt (abl. arising from) multiplicity avayavi-nāṇā-sthānātāvāt (abl. because) having parts – multiplicity – the stance ca and also saṁsayaḥ uncertainty (3.1.53) tvac-avayatirekāt (abl. known by) feel – not excluding na not indriya-antarā-artha-anupalabdheḥ (abl. known by) senses – inner – objects – failure to observe
5.17 There is uncertainty, because there is a multiplicity (of parts) in the
other stance, and because there is also the stance that the multiplicity belongs
to the one who has the parts, which is known by not excluding (the sphere of)
feel, not by failure to observe objects as the inner sense.

न युगपदद्यानुपलनः। (त्र्यंबकविशेषणयूक्तप्रभुपदेश्यादि:।) व्याहतत्वादाहिस्त:।

Vb) विप्रतिषेध्याचाः

(3.1.54) na neither yugapat_artha-anupalabdheḥ (abl. by) immediate –
object – failing to observe tvac-avayava-viśeṣa-dhūma-upalabdhisvāt (vati
like) feel – part, subdivision – the act of distinguishing – smoke – observing tat-
upalabdhisvā such – observation vyāhatvāt (abl. because) absurdity ahetuḥ no
grounds (3.1.55) vipratiṣedhāt (abl. because) general denial ca and

5.18 (On the other hand,) neither is it by failing to observe that there is an
immediate (physical) object. Such an observation would be like observing
smoke by distinguishing it as a subdivision of feel. That is not our grounds
for knowledge, because of its absurdity and because it would be generally denied.

Chapter Six

न त्वंकाः। इन्द्रियार्थप्रबलताः। न तद्दशबुद्धताः। गन्धत्वाध्यतिरिक्ताः गन्धादीनामप्र-
tिषेधः।

na and not tvac-ekā feel (f.) – as only one (f.) (3.1.56) indriya-artha-
pañcatvāt (abl. since) those (senses) – objects – being five in number (3.1.57) na
not tat-artha-bahu-tvāt (abl. known by) their – objects – multiplicity (3.1.58)
gandha-tva-ādi-avyatirekāt (abl. just because) smell – abstract essence of – and
the others – not excluding gandha-ādīnām (gen. pl. belonging to) smell – and the
others apratiṣedhaḥ no denying

6.1) It is not a matter of feel as only one (sense), because of the objects of
sense being five, (but) those (senses) are not known just by the multiplicity of
their objects. That (multiplicity) is no denial (of our premise) just because we
do not exclude the abstract essence of smell and the others that belongs to
(physical) smell and the others.
6.2 The wholeness that is known by not excluding the essence of that sphere is not known by the existence of those five in the birth-rank of some physical form as (for example) an incarnation of one possessed of wisdom (a priest), or of a ruler. It is rather an affinity in the character of observation of their particular gross elements and that of their essential constituents (guṇas).

(3.1.64) na not the case sarva – guṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) all together – levels of merit (the opponent's definition) – no observation (3.1.65) ekaikaśyena (ind.) severally, one by one uttara-uttara – guṇa-sadbhāvāt (abl. since) "higher and higher", progression, hierarchy (both apply here) – merit – reality uttara-uttarāṇām (gen. of) more and more advanced things tat-anupalabdhiḥ that, such – no observation (saṁsargāt (abl. coming from) combination ca and, whereas aneka-guṇa-grahaṇam several – qualities – personal apprehension Vb)
6.3 (To the objection) that that (wholeness) is not the case, because one cannot observe guṇas as a totality; that there is no observation of that (totality) of more and more advanced beings, since the reality of the guṇas as more and more advanced must be one at a time, whereas our personal apprehension as the several guṇas (prakṛti) would come from a combination of them ...

(3.1.66) viṣṭam (n.) that which encompasses (cf. √veṣṭ/veṣṭa (n.) MW, not a past participle) hi because a-param-pareṇa (ind.) without – one following another (3.1.67) na there is no pārthiva-āpyayoh (gen. dual of) consisting of earth – consisting of water pratyakṣatvāt (abl. since) perception (The abstract form is for emphasis.) (3.1.68) pūrva-pūrva – guṇa-utkarṣāt (abl. due to) one thing over the previous thing – merit (He cleverly uses a third meaning of guṇa) – superiority tat-tat-pradhānam one over another – principal (3.1.69) tat-vyavasthānam that (the referent is pratyakṣatva) – perseverance tu rather bhūyastvāt (abl. w/tu apart from, opposed to) the becoming more advanced (This is the sense of superiority or importance rather than size or abundance.) (3.1.70) sa-guṇānām (gen. pl. on the part of) possessed of – quality, merit, virtue

6.4 (The reply is:) Because it (prakṛti) is that which encompasses (everything), without the one (incarnation) following the other, because of its being a perception of those (bodies) consisting of earth and water, it's not that one is chief over the other due to the superiority in merit of one (incarnation) over the previous. It is rather a matter of perseverance in that ('being' a perception), as opposed to the becoming more advanced on the part of those possessed of merit.

(इन्द्रियभावात्। तेनेव तत्साध्याप्राप्तः। न शब्दगुणोपलब्धः।) तदुपल्लिपिततंत्रङ्गमुण्डितात्तदाधिकारितात्। कर्मार्दार्थायामृत्युज्ञतं। कर्माग्रोध्य्यामृत्युज्ञतं। साध्यायामृत्युज्ञतं। साध्यायामृत्युज्ञसत्तात्।)

indriya-bhāvāt (3.1.71) tena eva tasya (The author would have used "tat" in compound) agrahaṇāt ca (3.1.72) na śabda-guṇa-upalabdheḥ; That (abstract perception) would not result from observation of the essential constituent of sound (the ether), because there exists a sense organ for that (the ear), and surely there is no personal apprehension by that means. (The practical-minded
commenter doesn't get the abstraction of sound into ether, mentioned here by the author. (3.1.73) tat-upalabdhīḥ it – observation itara-itara-dravya-guṇa-vaidharmyāt (abl.) (As the opposite (sa vs. vi) of the following term in the ablative without "ca", this ablative sense is "apart from", or "as opposed to"). respective – tangible, physical thing – merit – inconsistency (3.2.1) karma-ākāśa-sādharmyāt (abl. according to) the performance of proper actions – ether (This refers obliquely to satata, the continuous sound 2.2.34.) – consistency with dharma saṃśayaḥ uncertainty (3.2.2) viṣaya-pratyabhijñānāt (abl. by) sphere of objects – recognition (3.2.3) sādhyā-samātvāt (abl. from) premise – substitution ahetuḥ no true grounds or basis for knowledge

6.5 The uncertainty is the observation of it according to our (thesis of) consistency of both the karmas and the ether, as opposed to the inconsistency of the (three dharmic) guṇas as the respective physical forms. No true grounds for knowledge can come from any 'equivalent' of our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), by recognizing only that sphere (of physical forms).

The karmas are the repetitions of daily rituals, and the ether is the element associated with hearing the continuous sound. The author clearly states in 2.2.30-38 that these two realities are to be taken together.

6.6 (To the objection) that it is not the case, because there is no such immediate personal apprehension, and if there were no recognition of those (physical forms) at all, then we are occupied with passing out of existence; that the personal apprehension is not immediate, because there are modes of existence by stages (incarnations), and that the failure to recognize it is due to our own ardent devotion to our 'inner' sphere, ...
The Nyaya Darshana

न गत्यभावात्। स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत্঵ाभिमानः। (न हेत्यभावात Vb) स्फटके-प्रयपरापरोपत्तेः क्षणिकतायत्वकीनामहेतुः।

(3.2.8) na not so gati-abhāvāt (abl. because) transmigration – without existence or substance, empty (3.2.9) sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimānavat (vati just like) crystal – being something other – self-conception tat-anyatva-abhimānah that (referent = viṣaya-antara 3.2.7) the being something other – self-conception (na hetu-abhāvāt Vb) (3.2.10) sphaṭake api crystal – even though apara-apara-upatthe (abl. by) one following the other – birth, incarnation kṣāṇikatvāt (abl. through) ephemerality vyaktinām (gen. of) individuals ahetuḥ no grounds

6.7 (The reply is:) No, because that (notion of) transmigration (reincarnation) is without substance. Any self-conception of being something other than just that (inner sphere) is just like the self-conception of being something other than the crystal. Even though one is the crystal (figuratively), there can be no true grounds for knowledge through (the notion of) the ephemerality of individuals by one birth following another.

(नियमहेतुभावायद्धार्यानभाजन्याः। नेत्तत् विनिविचारकरणोपत्तेः। क्षीरविनाशो कार-णानुपवद्धूत्तित्विच ततुपपत्ति। लिङ्गतो ग्रहणानि नुपलसम्बधि।)

(3.2.11) niyama-hetu-abhāvāt yathā darśanam abhyanujñā; Because he gives no reason for this rule, it is a matter of seeing whatever he permits.) (3.2.12) na not upatti-vināśa-karaṇa-upalabdheḥ (abl. according to) birth, coming into existence – annihilation (intrans.), passing out of existence – cause(s) – observation (3.2.13) kṣīra-vināśe (loc. when) milk – passing out of existence kāraṇa-anupalabdhhavat (vatup having) cause – not observed / dadhi-utpattivat (vati like) curds – coming into existence ca and tat-upapattih those – evidence (3.2.14) liṅgataḥ (tasil: resulting from) indicator (body) grahaṇāt (abl. because) personal apprehension na not anupalabdhiḥ without observation

6.8 (To the objection) that it is not so, according to the observation of causes of coming into existence and passing out of existence; that when milk passes out of existence (by curdling), this has a cause, which is (however) not observed, and that the evidence of those (individuals) is like the coming into existence of the curds, because personal apprehension results from (seeing) one's (physical) indicator, which does not go without observation.
Chapter Six

((3.2.15) na payasaḥ pariṇāma-guṇa-antara-prādurbhāvāt; (He says) no, because it is a matter of manifestation on the part of the inner guṇas in the transformation of the milk. This seems to be interpolation, probably meant to explain the terms vyūha-antara and dravya-antara. The commenter uses terminology from YD 6.15: "abhibhava-prādurbhāvau nirodha-kṣaṇa-cittavivayāḥ nirodha-parināmaḥ" He uses the YD word for transformation, rather than this author's, and he even uses a different word for milk.) (3.2.16) vyūha-antarāt (abl. according to) arrangement – inner dravya-antarata-utpattidārśanam the physical (reality) – inner – coming into existence – seeing // pūrva-dravyā-nivrūṭteḥ (gen. of) existing previously – physical (reality) – cessation anumānam inference (3.2.17) (see the similar 2.1.19-20) kvacīt in one case vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ (abl. since) passing out of existence – cause – non-observance kvacīt in the other case ca and upalabdheḥ (abl. since) observation anekāntaḥ not just the one way exclusively

6.9 (The reply is:) According to the inner arrangement, one sees the coming into existence of what is inner to its (milk's) physical reality, (but) of the cessation of a physical reality previous (to its curdling) there is only inference (see śeṣavat 1.1.5), since in that case there is no observation of a cause of (the previous thing) passing out of existence. Moreover, since in the other case (the coming into existence) there is observation, it cannot be just the one way.

नेत्रित्यायर्योष्टतद्विनिश्चित्तपि ज्ञानवस्थानात्। युगपत्ते यानुपलब्धेष्व न मनसः। तदात्मगु- ण्ठेष्वपि तुत्त्वम्।

(3.2.18) na not indriya-arthayoh (gen. dual; of) sense – object tat-vināśe (loc. where; The usual "even though" w/api doesn't work here.) that – passing out of existence api (emphatic) surely must jñāna-avasthānāt (abl. known by) comprehension – life condition (3.2.19) yugapat in the immediate present jñeya-anupalabdheḥ (abl. known by) to be comprehended – failure to observe ca na and not manasaḥ (gen. on the part of, by) the mind's (3.2.20) tat-ātma-ghuṇatve (loc. where) that – essence – guṇa-state api surely must tulyam (ind.) equally, w/cana, not any more than
6.10 That (inner arrangement) is not known (exclusively) by a life of comprehension of (only) the sense and its physical object where that (object) surely must pass out of existence, any more than it is known (exclusively) in the immediate present by non-observation of that (physical object) which would be comprehended by the mind where it surely must be (only) the guṇa-state as the essence of that (object).

6.11 There is no coming into existence of that (object) in the absence of the drawing-in-together of mind with the senses (not just object and senses 3.2.18), which (mind) cannot be without assigning a cause of its coming into existence, and this is without observing a cause of its passing out of existence in real life.

6.12 Thus, it (ours) is an occupation with life as a constancy. Our passing out of existence, (while still) possessed of the (continuous) sound, is known by an understanding that is something other than any understanding that comes about by grasping the idea of inconstancy (of objects). This is the case for a mind that is known by the drawing-in-together within the realm of the individual self of one who has come to true comprehension.
6.13 According to the smṛti's (teaching of) 'coming into existence', our immediate coming into existence is not the case. It is not the case for a mind known (only) by its mode of existence as the inner aspect of a (preexisting) body, (but) that is without our grounds for knowledge, because it would have to be demonstrated. There is no denying (our premise) just by their evidence of that (mind) being contained by a body that results from 'physical intimacy'.

6.14 It is not the case for a mind that is known by its tendency of quick movement in that (recitation of smṛti, literally, "remembering")—which itself cannot be without fixing the actual time of remembering (the present). Nor is its special conjunction with that individual's deliberate (proper) action, his spontaneous (pure) nature, and his being wise and learned, the case.
6.15 For a mind thus preoccupied (3.2.31), it is the same with foot pain (for example) as it is with that special conjunction. For those whose comprehension begins with the \textit{indicator} of that attention (the foot), according to that view, that (conjunction) is not immediate.

6.16 The memory of the comprehender's origination and cessation, being caused by his (previous) desire and aversion, cannot be immediate either. There is no denying (our premise) by (asserting) the desire and aversion being his \textit{indicator}, (residing) within that which consists of organic substance and the others (his body).
viśeṣakau on that (point) – petty distinctions (a kan kamārtha taddhita form; "only resembling a valid distinction") (3.2.38) yathā-ukta-hetu-tvāt (abl. for) has been declared – motivation (a different use for hetu) – being a matter of

6.17 From seeing origination (impulse) and cessation (letting go) in (wielding) axes and such (like pestles and arrows; see the Vaisheshika Chapter Five on karma), we know that (body as indicator) is no grounds for knowledge, since there is no observation of it in pitchers and the like. That rule (of karma) and the lack of it, however, are petty distinctions on the point, that being a matter of the motivation (toward proper behavior) supplied by that (law) which has been declared.

पारतन्त्रयाकुलाभयागमाच न मनसः। परिशोषणयथोत्तपपत्तेत्। स्मरण त्वात्मनो

इतरभावयात।

pāratantryāt (abl. according to) (See paratantra 1.1.29.) being a theory for others akṛta-abhyāgamāt (abl. known by) (recalls "aparīṣita-abhyupagamāt" 1.1.31) who has not done – accepting ca na nor is it the case manasaḥ (gen. for) mind (3.2.39) pariśeṣāt (abl. ind.) left over yathā-ukta-hetu-upapatteḥ (abl. from) has been declared – motive – evidence ca even (3.2.40) smaraṇam the act of remembering tu but ātmanāḥ (gen. belonging to) individual self jñā-svābhāvyāt (abl. emerging from) comprehender – state of self-existence

6.18 Nor is it the case for a mind known by that which we accept without having done (the examination), according to our 'theory for others' (see 1.1.29); but even our act of remembering that (before-state), left over from our evidence of the motive supplied by 'that which has been declared' (law, smṛti), belongs to our individual self emerging from the state of self-existence of the comprehender.

(अनिधाननिविष्णाभ्यासलिङ्गक्षणसारंस्वयंपरियोग्यायाधितसम्बन्धानन्तर्विवेकविकार- विरोधानात्मकाक्षवर्धनसुखःखच्छद्रेश्वरभाष्याधित्तितिक्षयांगमार्थर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः।

कर्मानविश्वासितग्रहत।अव्यक्तग्रहणम अवन्वस्थापितवां विचुतसम्पत्तेत् पावन्वकारण-वत्।)

(3.2.42) karma-anavasthāyi-grahaṇāt / an-avasthāyitvāt vidyut-sampāte rūpa-avyakta-grahaṇavat; The causes (of karmic 'memories') are: (as stated in 3.2.41). The idea of being unmanifest arises from the personal apprehension of being without any karmic circumstance, like the personal apprehension of the unmanifest (leftover) visual image after lightning strikes, without the condition of having the actual circumstance (of lightning).

This interpolation, between chapters, and identifiable by the long compound, seems to be inspired by the mention of memory (smaraṇa) and soul (ātman). The commenter attempts to explain how residual karma exists as 'memories' while the soul is unmanifest between incarnations. But he misunderstands the author's thesis, as religious commentators to the Darshanas are apt to do, so instead of any sign of comprehension, we see just another list of words to be memorized and recited by the students of his school. The lightning example is nice though.

Chapter Seven

(3.2.44) hetu-upādānāt (abl. since) grounds – accepting unto oneself pratiṣedha-vyābhyanujāṇā denial – comprehensive admittance (3.2.45) pradīpa-arciḥ illumination, exposition – light saṁtati-abhivyakta-grahaṇavat (vati like) continuity – become manifest – self-perception tat-grahaṇam in it – personal apprehension (3.2.46) dravye (loc. when it comes to) physical svaguṇa-paraguṇa -(gen.)- upalabdheḥ (gen. of, about) one's own essential constituents – another's essential constituents -(gen. of)- observation saṁśayaḥ uncertainty

7.1 (Therefore,) since one must accept any grounds for knowledge unto oneself, there should be comprehensive admittance of the denials (as well). (So) there is the light of our exposition, in which personal apprehension is like perceiving oneself as the continuity (of sound) become manifest, (but) there is (also) the uncertainty about the observation of one's own essential constituents vs. those of another, when it comes to the physical (world).
The term "accepting unto oneself" (upādāna cf. SD) means that, for a person who comprehends that truth, any idea he entertains or understands must be owned, even if rejected. He is certainly not advising that we hold to the truth of some assertion and to the truth of its logical opposite in the same universe of discourse.

7.2 To whatever extent that (observation) of visual form and the other (essential constituents) stems from the inevitability of a (pre-existing) body, that (observation) of the coming into existence through inner essential constituents on the part of one born out of their development, is not the case, (but) there is no denying (our premise) just by our opposition's affirmation of being born out of (karmic) development.

(3.2.50) śarīra-vyāpitvāt (3.2.51) na keśa-nakhādiṣu anupalabdheḥ (3.2.52) tvac-paryantatvāt śarīrasya; This (following material) is according to his theory of pervasion of those (guṇas) in the body, but they are not known from the body's being encompassed by feel, because there would be no observation (of guṇas) in hair and nails and so on. "Hair and nails" stands out, so he comments on it./ keśa-nakhādiṣu (loc. in) hair – nails – etc. aprasaṅgāḥ no occupation with (life) (3.2.53) śarīra-guṇa-vaidharmyāt (abl. because) body – essential constituents – inconsistency (3.2.54) na not rūpādīnām (gen. of) visual form and the others itaretara-vaideharmyāt (abl. because) one vs. another – inconsistency (3.2.55) ainḍriyakātvāt (abl. by) being related to the senses rūpādīnām (gen. of) visual form etc. apratiṣedhāḥ no denying
7.3 There is no occupation (with life) in the hair and nails and so on, because of the inconsistency of that with our (thesis of) essential constituents of the body. It is not (however) because of a lack of consistency with the visual form etc. of one (person's body) vs. another's, (so) there is no denying (our premise) just by that form and the others' being related to the physical senses.

Obviously, the body is not made of air, fire, water, and earth, in the sense that one could examine it under magnification and find tiny bits of those things held together somehow. Notwithstanding the reality of the body that we all know as made of molecules, the authors of the Darshanas describe another equally true reality where the body is not just an object that is experienced and then explained, but the very experience itself. The experience is the thing that can be realized as the essential constituents, first of feel, and developing out of that, visual form, taste, and smell, corresponding respectively to the four elements mentioned. Those four essential constituents are pervaded by a constant ethereal spatial substance (ākāśa), which manifests as the subtlest comprehension of sound. Interestingly, the author's choice of hair and nails to illustrate this point has the additional charm that those are most obvious parts of the body in which there is no sensation of feel.

ज्ञानायोगप्यादित्क मनः। न युगपदनेनकियोपतथः। अत्यतचक्कर्षणवत्त्युपत्त्यिः।

(3.2.56) jñāna-ayaugapadyāt (abl. for) true comprehension – not having immediacy (The author's yugapat in compound doesn't require the determinative complement to be "simultaneous with something"). ekam alone solitary, on its own manah mind (3.2.57) na not yugapat immediate / aneka-kriya-upalabdheḥ (abl. for) many – activities – observation (3.2..58) alāta-cakra-darśanavat (vati like) firebrand ("unsconced" torch?) – circle – seeing tat-upalabdhiḥ it – observation // āśu-saṁcārāt (abl. ind.) quickly – moving (3.2.59) yathā-ukta-hetutvāt (abl. ind.) that which has been declared (not "as stated above") – with the motivation of ca and aṇu finely divided

7.4 (In fact,) not having the immediacy of true comprehension, that 'mind' (the "aindriyaka") on its own (without comprehension) is not immediate, for one does observe its manifold activity. Observation of it is like seeing a (whole) circle made by (swinging) a burning stick. Moving quickly and with the motivation of that (law, smṛti) which has been declared, that (karma which is the object of this metaphor) is finely divided.
He gives an example of the relationship of a sense impression as one of a series progressing through time, and the impression as it exists in the present. With the swinging firebrand, what is seen as a whole orange circle in the dark is considered to be an innumerable series of positions of the burning tip, in time and space, as parts of the whole. (Of course, the physiological explanation of this phenomenon, as interesting as it may be, is not really the point here.)

7.5 The coming into existence of that (mind) is known by its incidental attachment as the maturation of the previously created (individual self, "ātman" 3.2.40). Accepting that unto oneself is like accepting one's own physical form, (made) from the gross elements, unto oneself; (but) not by its being an equivalent for our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), (that is,) not because of that (pūrva-kṛta) being the instrumental cause of the coming into existence (bodily incarnation) that has to do with a mother and father.

This could just as easily be read as a declaration of karma and re-incarnation. I think, however, that the author meant to use these same words to express his own quite different thesis, perhaps even with the dual meaning in mind. The language is clear and precise for the task: Phala "fruit" from √phal meaning to "burst open", as a ripened pod, is the perfect description of the development of the subtle senses "rūpādi" (=tanmātrāni) through the mind, out of the individual self, "ātman" (=ahaṁkāra SD, =ahaṁnāman BU), which is made (not "done") previously "pūrva-kṛta" in the series, out of the constant self (jña-svābhāvya in 3.2.40, =Brahman in BS, =Mahat in VD, SD). All of this is consistent with the series as outlined in both the Vaisheshika and Sankhya Darshanas.
7.6 In addition to that (body), it is the same way with the acquisition of one's livelihood (life-circumstance)—without our rule (of "coming into existence")—as it is with the (rule of the) instrumental cause of the coming into existence of one's body (from 3.1.63; i.e., not the case). To the objection that those (body and livelihood) are caused by an unseen force, and our occupation (with life) is repeated until final release; the reply is: no, for we see its origination as a union (yoga) of creator and non-creator.

(3.2.64) tathā the same way āhārasya (gen. of) livelihood (not "food" here)
(3.2.65) prāptau (loc. with) acquisition ca in addition to that aniyanāt (abl. ind.) without the rule (3.2.66) śārīra-utpatti-nimittavat (vati like it is with) body – coming into existence – instrumental cause // (saṁyoga-utpatti-nimittam karma
(3.2.67) etena aniyanāḥ pratyuktaḥ; One's karma is the instrumental cause of the manifestation of one's connection (with body and livelihood). Thereby his lawless (doctrine) is refuted. (3.2.68) tat-adṛṣṭa-kāritam those – unseen – caused iti cet to the objection that: punar again, repeatedly tat-prasaṅgaḥ him – occupation with life apavarge (loc. until) final release (an opponent's definition) / na no karaṇa-akaraṇa-yoga-ārambha-darśanāt (abl. because) making – not making – union – origination – seeing

7.6 In addition to that (body), it is the same way with the acquisition of one's livelihood (life-circumstance)—without our rule (of "coming into existence")—as it is with the (rule of the) instrumental cause of the coming into existence of one's body (from 3.1.63; i.e., not the case). To the objection that those (body and livelihood) are caused by an unseen force, and our occupation (with life) is repeated until final release; the reply is: no, for we see its origination as a union (yoga) of creator and non-creator.

(3.2.69) manas-karma-nimitta-tvāt (abl. because) mind – activity – instrumental cause – the fact that ca moreover saṁyoga-anucchedah conjunction (cf. saṁyoga 3.2.31-32) – not cut off (3.2.70) nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ constancy – occupation ca and so prāyaṇa-anupatteḥ (abl. since) going away – no evidence ((3.2.71) aṇu śyāmatā-nityatvavat etat syāt; Perhaps that (constancy) is atomic, like the constancy of the blackness (of space.) (3.2.72) na not akṛta-abhyāgama-prasaṅgāt (abl. known from) by one who has not done (the examination) – accepted – occupation (4.1.1) pravṛttiḥ true account yathā-uktā already stated (4.1.2) tathā likewise doṣāḥ faulty or false ones
7.7 Moreover, because of the fact that the (body and livelihoods') instrumental cause is the activity of one's mind, its (the mind's) conjunction (with objects see saṁyoga 3.2.31-32) is never cut off and so we know that occupation as a constancy, since there is no evidence that it ever goes away. This (constancy) is not the one that is known from the kind of occupation that is accepted by one who hasn't done (the examination). This (3.2.69) is the (true) account we have already declared (in 1.1.17), and likewise (shall we speak of) the false ones, as follows:

The overall cause (kāraṇa) is the "supreme being" level of consciousness (4.1.19), whereas the subordinate "instrumental cause" (nimitta) is the mind. This is consistent with the outline presented in chapter three of the Sankhya. Here the author says that one's experience of some kind of body and some kind of life never goes away.

(4.1.3) tat (ind.) as follows (The translation of this is appended to the previous sentence. See also 5.1.2.) trairāśyam a group of three rāga-dveṣa-moha-arthāntara-bhāvāt (abl. known by) passion – aversion (=vairagya) – mindlessness – meanings – alternate – view (4.1.4) na it doesn't mean eka-pratyānīka-bhāvāt (abl. from) singular, pre-eminent, excellent (MW) – adversaries – view (4.1.5) vyabhicārāt (abl. just because) deviation ahetuḥ lack of grounds for knowledge (4.1.6) teṣām (gen. of) those mohaḥ mindlessness pāpiyāt (abl. for) worst // na not amūḍhasya (gen. of) non-mindless itara-utpatteḥ (abl. known by) as a counter – creation of, creating a

7.8 There is a (certain) group of three things known by a view of alternate meanings of passion, aversion (to passion), and mindlessness (representing rajas, sattva, and tamas). Just because this is a deviation from the view of our most excellent adversaries (the 'sattvic' priest/scholar class), that doesn't mean we lack grounds for knowledge. Of those (three), that (lack of grounds) is rather the mindlessness itself, for it is the worst, (but) this (mindlessness) is not known by creating the non-mindless (scholar class) as a counter to it.
7.9 From our instrumental cause and effect relation (of 3.2.69) comes our view of those alternate meanings, apart from the false (accounts). Ours is not one (a view) of mindlessness, just because we separate ourselves from those (scholars) who are characterized by separating from mohasya (gen. of) mindlessness (ref.=bhāva 4.1.7) (4.1.8) na not doṣa-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt (abl. just because) the false (accounts) – those characterized by – separating from mohasya (gen. of) mindlessness (ref.=bhāva 4.1.7) (4.1.9) nimitta-naimittika-upapatteḥ (abl. just by) instrumental cause – effect – evidence ca and again tulya-jātiyānām (gen. belonging to, held by) equals, peers – those of some class apratiṣedhaḥ no denying

7.10 There is their affirmation that there is a 'state of existence having passed on' (1.1.9, 19) as a (kind of) perpetuity of the soul, because from its manifestation they validate their perception of (past) manifestations; but this is not the case, for there is no such fashioning of a (soul's) vessel following from a (previous) vessel. There is no denying (our premise) just by their manifestation by fashioning a vessel.
7.11 Our view (4.1.7) does arise out of a state where it is not present, but not such that it could never again be depressed (by tamas)—which is not to be understood by applying those action words (utpatti and upamṛdya) in the sense of past and future. This is not because there is no fashioning something anew out of (the atoms of) things that have previously been destroyed. There is no denying (our premise) just by their dictating a series (of incarnations).

(4.1.19) Īśvaraḥ supreme governor, (not "God") kāraṇam cause puruṣa-karma-aphalya-(gen.)-darśanāt (abl. according to) personal karma – (fut.p.p. >caus.√phal) not to be brought to fruition – understanding (4.1.20) na not puruṣa-karma - abhāve (loc.) personal karma – without phala-anīspatteḥ (gen. of ref.=darśana 4.1.19) fruit – no fashioning (4.1.21) tat-kāritavāt (abl. for) by that – would be caused ahetuḥ without grounds for knowledge (4.1.22) animittataḥ (ind.) without instrumental cause bhāva-utpattiḥ a being – coming into existence.

7.12 The supreme being (Īśvara) is our cause. This is according to our understanding of 'not brought to fruition by personal karma', not that (understanding) of 'no fashioning of fruit without personal karma'. That is without our grounds for knowledge, for then one would be caused by that (karma, and not Īśvara). The coming into existence of a (human) being happens without that instrumental cause (karma 4.1.9).
7.13 According to our understanding of the sharpness of thorns and the like, it is not a matter of no instrumental cause (of the pain), just because of the instrumental cause (of pain, the thorn) being without that instrumental cause (karma). There is no denying (our premise) just by the view of that other meaning of both instrumental cause (karma) and then no such instrumental cause (liberation).

7.14 That the 'everyone' is inconstant, because of its being their nature to come into existence and then to pass out of existence, is not the case either, because of the very constancy of their inconstancy. Like that which remains to be extinguished (embers) even after extinguishing him, Agni's (constant) tendency to burn is (ironically) his inconstancy (as he consumes his own fuel), but there is no such refutation of the constant one (Īśvara).
Chapter Seven

7.15 Whatever (refutation) there might be that by our perseverance in that observation that the 'everyone' is constant, we admit to constancy of the five gross elements; that (refutation) is not valid, for we observe our cause (īśvara 4.1.19) of their coming into existence and passing out of existence, (so) it is not a denial (of our own premise) by disallowing personal qualities on their part.

The idea is that the constancy of one's own awareness, as the awareness of the supreme governor, pervades all notions of creation and destruction, including birth and death. He allows that physical objects, said to consist of gross elements, come and go, but the awareness that gives rise to them through the sensory powers is constant. According to this observation, it is not the actual physical flame, but one's awareness of "burning" that is the real nature of fire and thus its cause.

Again it may be emphasized that this is philosophy and not science. Everyone knows the scientific explanation of combustion, but a devoted reader of material like this must surely be one who wishes to delve into a deeper examination of the essential truth of what it really means to say there is such a thing as knowledge or a knower of it. Indeed, any paradigm like that of pure scientific reasoning that dismisses the value of such an examination out of hand wouldn't even count as philosophical knowledge. Nor should it be expected to, for this examination is outside the scope of scientific investigation.
7.16 The 'everyone' known from the individuality of human qualities (found) in the view of (many) distinct individuals is not known by the evidence of our perseverance. That (individuality) is not assessed by means of its several qualities, for it is a matter of the 'fashioning' (4.1.13) found in our view of the one (being). There is no denying (our premise) just by persevering only in the (division of human) qualities.

7.17 Our 'everyone' does not exist in the sense of 'beings' (plural), for that is just the empty affirmation of the 'one (soul) with respect to another' (view). It is not by any affirmation that one's own self-existence belongs (also) to those beings, nor by a tendency to see that (self-existence) all around, inferring it from the affirmation of one's own self-existence. Because of its absurdity, this is incompatible with that (concept of "self-existence").
7.18 There can be no affirmation of their reckoning of numbers (of souls) as the only way. That (self-existence) is known by our cause (īśvara 4.1.19, 30 being evident vs. not being evident, not by the view of subdivisions of that cause. We know from the state of being without any subdivisions, that such (a view) lacks our grounds for knowledge.

The view of the self-existence of others fades to nothing, deep into the examination of one's own self-existence, but only there. That place is a profound and very real dimension of existence, but it is ultimately private and has no practical application in ordinary life. This must have been just as clear to the authors of the Darshanas as it is to us. One doesn't proceed through daily life thinking about the souls of others. Both self-examination and the examination of scientific explanations for things require special deliberate attention in their own time, apart from the daily routine of life.

Chapter Eight

(4.1.44) 

sadyaḥ right away, at the very moment kāla-antare (ind.) after a period of time ca and phala-nispatteḥ (abl. because) fruit – fashioning saṁsayaḥ uncertainty (4.1.45) na not sadyaḥ in the moment kāla-antara-upabhogyatvāt (abl. because) time – period – to be enjoyed (4.1.46) kāla-antareṇa (inst. ind.) after a period of time an ispattih no fashioning hetu-vināśāt (abl. because) grounds for knowledge – nullification (4.1.47) prāṅc-nispatteḥ (abl. by) ahead of time – fashioning (vykṣa-phalavat tat syāt; vati+tat+syāt like the interp. 3.2.71)
8.1 There is uncertainty because any fashioning (incarnation) as the fruit of that (cause) must be in the moment, and after a period of time. That (incarnation) cannot be in the moment, because (the expectation of) what is to be enjoyed would be after a period of time, (yet) one does not fashion it after a period of time, because one's whole grounds for knowledge would be nullified by (the corollary) fashioning ahead of time (in the cycle).

नासन्त्र सत्ते सदस्तसदस्तोवेत्ता। उत्पादव्ययेर्दश्नितः। बुद्धिसिद्ध तुतदस्त। आशय-व्यतिरीकादु वृक्षफलोपत्तिविविद्यत्सहः। प्रीतेरात्माश्रयात्मादप्रतिद्वृत्तेः।

(4.1.48) na not asat non-enduring na not sat enduring na neither sat-asatoḥ both enduring and non-enduring sat-asatoḥ (loc. dual between) enduring – non-enduring vaidharmyāt (abl. because) inconsistency (4.1.49) utpāda-vyaya-darśanāt (abl. from) coming forth – passing away – seeing (4.1.50) buddhi-siddham understanding – affirmation tu but tat after all asat not enduring (4.1.51) āśraya-vyatirekāt (abl. because) seat – exclusion, separation vṛkṣa-phala-utpattivat (vati like) tree – fruit – coming into existence iti to say that ahetuḥ without grounds for knowledge (4.1.52) pṛteḥ (abl. by) satisfaction, joy ātma-āśrayatvāt (abl. due to) soul – its being the seat apratiṣedhaḥ no denying

8.2 (We say:) 'That (incarnation) is not non-enduring, yet it is not enduring, (but) neither can it be both enduring and non-enduring, because of the inconsistency between enduring and not enduring', but by seeing both its coming forth and its passing away one would affirm his understanding that it is, after all, not enduring. (But) the saying, "It is like the coming into existence of the fruit of a tree"—because there would be separation of the seat (the bodily incarnation "fruit", from the soul "tree")—is not our grounds for knowledge. There is no denying (our premise) just by the notion that its (the incarnation's) joy is due to its being the (temporary) seat of one's soul.

न पुत्रपशुपशु-परिच्छद्धिरणाचारकदिनिणिर्देशातः। तत्समवेत्र-ग्लालिनिष्केर्तेतो मायाकल-पन्नाः। विविधाध्यायोपादः। खेमवद जन्मोपत्तिः।

(4.1.53) na not the case putra-paśu-strī-paricchada-hiraṇya-anna-ādi-phala-nirdeśāt (abl. just because) sons – cattle – wives – household – money – food – etc. – fruits – dictating (4.1.54) tat it is so sambandhāt (abl. according to) their – kinship / phala-niṣpatteḥ (abl. by) fruit – fashioning teṣu (loc. if) those
phalavat (vati like) upacāraḥ figuratively (4.1.55) vividha-bādhanā-(gen.)-yogāt (abl. because) various – frustrations – association duḥkham suffering eva indeed, actually janma-uptattih birth – coming into existence

8.3 That (notion of joy as 'fruit') is not the case, just because they dictate that sons, cattle, wives, household, money, food, etc. are fruits (of karma). It is so, according to the (religious) kinship, (but) if those things are by some 'fashioning' of fruit, it means only like fruit, figuratively. Indeed, because of the association of various frustrations, the coming into existence by birth is actually suffering.

न सुखस्य (अपि MUM) आन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः। बाधनानिर्वृतेवैद्यतः पर्येषणदोषादप्रति- पेधः। द्वृखविकत्ये सुखाभिमानाच।

(4.1.56) na not sukhasya (gen. abbr; of ref.=yogāt) happiness api even āntarāla-nispatteḥ (abl. by) being related to one's inner realm – fashioning (4.1.57) bādhanā-nirvṛtteḥ (abl. since) frustration – cessation (=nirvṛtteḥ) vedayataḥ (√vid (transitive) caus.pres.3rd.dual) those two cause one to find them, i.e., "show themselves" (=darsayataḥ in BS 9.18) // paryesaṇa-doṣāt (abl. by) striving after – fault, mistake apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (4.1.58) duḥkha-vikalpe (loc. in the midst of) suffering – diversity sukha-abhimānāt (abl. by) happiness – mistaken conception ca and

8.4 There is not even any (association) of happiness by the fashioning being related to one's inner realm, (but) since that is just the cessation of one's frustration, both show themselves. There is no denying (our premise) by the false (account of) striving after that (happiness), and by the false conception of happiness in the midst of all the diversity of suffering.

ऋणक्षेप्रवृत्तिनिर्बन्धात् (अपवर्गाभव:।) प्रधानवाद्यानुपपत्तेरुपंशब्दनानुवादो निन्दाप्रिय- दोषोपपत्तेः। (अधिकाराच विधानविद्यान्तरवत्। VB) समारोपणादातमन्त्रप्रतिपेधः।

(पात्रचयानानुपपत्तेः MUM) (फलवाभच:। MUM)

(4.1.59) ṛṇa-kleṣa-pravṛtti-anubandhāt (abl. since) the three obligations – struggle – account – incidental attachment (apavarga-abhāvaḥ) (4.1.60) pradhāna-śabda-anupapatteḥ (abl. due to) principal, prime – word, sound – not evident guṇa-śabdena (inst. through) secondary, subordinate – word, teaching
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(like guṇakarman MW) anuvādaḥ explanation nindā-praśāṁsā-upapatteḥ (abl.) reproach – praise – evident by (adhikārāt ca vidhānam vidyā-antaravat) (4.1.61) samāropaṇāt (abl. by) (fr. caus. of √ruḥ to grow) causing to ascend, having an advancing effect ētmanī (loc. on) individual self, soul apratiṣedhaḥ no denying (4.1.62) pātra-caya – anta – anupapatteḥ (abl. by) masters – assemblage (This pun also reads, "a bunch of (soul) vessels"). – boundaries (See vibhakti-antāḥ in 2.2.58.) – without evidence ca and (phala-abhāvaḥ)

8.5 Since that (frustration) is just an incidental attachment to the account of struggle through the (three) obligations (outlined in the smṛti), that ('struggle') explanation by evidence of the reproach vs. praise (method) through the subordinate 'word' (the smṛti), is due to the prime word (oṁ) not being evident. There is no denying (our premise) by (the view of) that (obligation) having an advancing effect on one's soul, and by the 'boundaries' (of souls, see 2.2.58) held by the assemblage of masters, without any evidence.

8.6 For one who is asleep (to the truth), there is (the notion of) a state after final release, as if there were a (permanent) absence of struggle, where one doesn't even experience dreaming, but our account of life is not for the purpose of a 'rebuilding' on the part of one who struggles through his inadequacy, nor of the continuous struggle (itself) as being the very nature of one's existence. (Conversely,) there would be impermanence of one's before-birth state (see 2.2.12), as if that absence (of struggle) were not permanent, even though that (absence) should then be the very nature of one's existence.
[(4.1.67) aṇu śyāmatā-nityatvavat vā; The alternative is that like the constancy of the blackness (of space,) so is the atomic (constant). (see interpolation 3.2.71] (4.1.68) na not saṁkalpa-nimittatvāt (abl. due to) deliberate acts – instrumental cause ca also rāgādīnām (gen. of) passion etc. (4.2.1) doṣa-nimittānām (gen. of) faults – instrumental causes tattva-jñānāt (abl. by) essence – true comprehension ahaṁkāra-nivṛttiḥ personal identity, ego – turning away from (4.2.2) doṣa-nimittam fault – instrumental cause rūpādayāḥ forms etc. viṣayāḥ spheres of experience saṁkalpa-kṛtāḥ things deliberately done (4.2.3) tat-nimittam tu those – instrumental cause – but really, "the true" avayavi-abhīmānaḥ having parts, subdivided but whole – mistaken conception

8.7 That (nature of one's existence) is not also due to that (struggle) being the instrumental cause of one's deliberate acts of passion etc. It is by true comprehension of the essence of the instrumental causes of such faults that one turns away from that (passion etc.) of his personal identity (ego). This instrumental cause of his fault would be the forms etc. (he has taken), the spheres (of life) he has experienced, and the acts he has deliberately done; but the true instrumental cause of it is rather his mistaken ('everyone' 7.16) conception about the subdivided whole (of humanity)

विद्याविद्याद्विविध्यात संशयः। तद्संशयः पूर्वेदुप्रसिद्धत्वात। वृट्त्यनुपपत्तेऽर्ति तथि न संशयः। कृत्त्वेकदेशाविद्वित्तवाद्वायावानामववव्यभावः।

(4.2.4) vidyā-avidyā-dvāvidhyāt (abl. due to) profound knowledge – lacking profound knowledge – twofold nature saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (4.2.5) tat then asaṁśayaḥ no uncertainty pūrva-hetu-prasiddhatvāt (abl. ind. as) as before, again – basis of knowledge – being (becoming) well-established (4.2.6) vṛtti-anupapatteḥ (abl. since) pursuit of life – lacking evidence api surely tarhi when it is / na no saṁśayaḥ uncertainty (4.2.7) kṛtsna-ekadeśa-avṛttiśāt (ind.) entirety – single individual – there being no such life avayavānām (gen. on the part of) subdivisions avayavi-abhāvāḥ subdivided whole – no such thing
8.8 Due to the twofold nature of having the profound knowledge and then not having the profound knowledge, there is uncertainty about it, and then no uncertainty, as our grounds for knowledge becomes thoroughly established again. When it is (established), since that (grounds of knowledge) is surely lacking any evidence of such a (faulty) life, one has no uncertainty that there is no such thing as that ('everyone' 7.16) subdivided whole, there being no such (faulty) life on the part of (human) subdivisions as single individuals within the entirety (of humanity).

8.9 Since one is without any such (faulty) life along with those (subdivisions), and since one is without any such (faulty) life even as an individual apart from any subdivisions, it is indeed not that (kind of) subdivisions of a subdivided whole. Since the partition does not exist along with the one (being), that (theory of subdivisions) appears in the absence of our (private) inquiry, for that (inquiry) is not considered to be (proper) evidence when applying the scripture on partition (the smṛti).
anatikrameṇa (instr. ind.) self-sphere – without stepping beyond (=vyatireka)
indriyasya (gen. belonging to) sense paṭu-manda-bhāvāt (abl. according to)
sharp – dull – view viṣaya-grahaṇasya (gen. belonging to) object sphere – personal apprehension

8.10 Even without considering the view of our inner subdivision (of essential constituents, etc.) that (scripture) is still no grounds for knowledge, because there is no such (faulty) life, the observation of which would be like observing, in a bunch of (dark-colored) hair, a dark-colored one. Without stepping beyond the self-sphere, that (observation) belongs to one's sense (of sight), but according to the view of the sharp vs. the dull (non-mindless vs. mindless 4.1.6), it belongs only to one's (limited) personal apprehension in the object sphere.

तथाभमावयो नमासवषय | अवयवायविप्रसद्ध्विक्षृतमाप्रलयात्। न प्रयलयोऽण
| त्वमात्।
| (परं वा जुटे:।) आकाशाव्यतिभेदानां दत्तवपति:।

(4.2.14 cont.) tathā according to that abhāvaḥ without substance / na neither aviṣaye (loc. ind.) without the object sphere pravṛttiḥ account of life (4.2.15) avayava-avayavi-prasaṅgaḥ subdivisions – whole – occupation ca moreover evam just as it is ā-pralayāt (abl. ind.) up to the point of – dissolution (4.2.16) na not prayalaḥ dissolution aṇu-sat-bhāvāt (abl. according to) atoms – primary reality (4.2.17) param_vā truṭeḥ; the alternative being that it is of the atom. see interpolations 3.2.71, 4.1.67) (4.2.18) ākāśa-(gen.)-vyati-bhedāt (abl. because) ether – going beyond – partition tat-anupapattiḥ that – failure of evidence

8.11 According to that (object sphere), that (self sphere) has no substance, (but) neither does our account of life without the object sphere. Moreover, our occupation with that (life) as a whole with its subdivisions, just as it is, only happens up to the point of its dissolution, and that dissolution can nor happen according to the view of the (primary) reality of atoms. That (view) fails because, going beyond that, there would then be partition of the ether.
8.12 The (third see 4.2.35-38) alternative is that the 'everyone' does not apply for the ether, (but rather) for the physical reality as its effect, both inner and outer, (i.e.) both according to the teaching that that (ether) is the inner cause, yet with nothing to be caused, which is without that (atomic) view, and according to the preeminent authority joining together in the scripture that that (view of the primacy of atoms) applies for everyone; …

अव्यूहायिष्मविभवुच्छानि चाकाशाधर्माः। मूर्तिमतां च संस्कृतवसद्वित्ववस्वविद्याः।

(संयोगपपत्तकारः) अनवस्थाकारित्ववदनवसानूपपपत्त्वप्रतिक्षेयः।

8.13 … (i.e.) both that those dharmas (essential qualities, an intentional double meaning) of the ether are its being without an ordered structure, without external support, and causative of whatever is manifest, and that those (dharmas) of the incarnations are known by the evidence of their physical forms, which is the view of the primary reality of subdivisions. There is no denying (our premise) by (the notion of) being the agent of one's own transience, and by the failed evidence that there even is transience.
8.14 But there is no direct observation of the true nature of those beings by such an intellectual discussion. The failure to observe that (true nature) is like the failure to observe the primary reality in cloth (on the loom) when pulling out the warp threads (the foundation). Because of it's absurdity, that (failure to observe) is not our grounds for knowledge.

8.15 There is the personal apprehension both arising from being the seat of that (intellect) without separation from it, and arising from understanding the meaning according to our validation, (i.e.,) by either missing the evidence or having the evidence of our validation (respectively).
reality right here before our eyes.) pramāṇa-prameya-abhimānaḥ validation – to be validated – self-conception (4.2.32) māyā -gandharva-nagara- mṛga-trṣṇikāvat (vati like) (ibc) illusory image of: – heavenly singers – city – a "seeking" (water) thirst, a mirage vā on the other hand (4.2.33) hetu-abhāvāt (abl. due to) grounds for knowledge – absence asiddhiḥ no affirmation (4.2.34) smṛti-saṁkalpavat (vati like) memory – imagination ca and then svapna-viṣaya-abhimānaḥ dream – sphere, world – self-conception

8.16 Like a self-conception in a dream world, this (world) too is a self-conception that arises according to our (definition of) 'validation and what is to be validated'. On the other hand, 'like the illusory image of the city of the Gandharvas, or a mirage', there may be no affirmation (of our validation) due to the absence of our grounds for knowledge, and then it (actually) is just a self-conception in a dream world, just like memory or imagination.

8.17 One does away with observing wrongly (like that) 1.) by true comprehension of the essence, and, 2.) like the disappearance of one's dream-world self-conception upon waking, by understanding the way things actually are by the observation that that primary ('waking') reality is the instrumental cause; and, 3.) since that (alone) is understanding wrongly, because that partition has our essence as its head, that the evidence is of a dual nature.

These three clearly correspond to the threefold "sāṁyama" of YD 6.7, 6.9, and 6.8 respectively.
8.18 By the discipline of repeating this particular (threefold) contemplation, and also by proceeding with life as usual, including (attending to) hunger, etc., (but) not by the predominance of particular objects, the evidence of that (life) becomes known by its incidental attachment as an outward development of the previously created (individual self (see YD 8.1)). This is the discipline of Yoga they teach in the forest, in the caves, and on the banks of the river (Ganges). (See gaṅgā and yoga sādhanā 2.2.62.)

Chapter Nine - Equivalents

(4.2.43) apavarge_api (loc. with api; hypothetical, "even though ... it would be") done with evam exactly as it is prasaṅgaḥ occupation (4.2.44) na not the case niṣpanna-a vaisyam fashioned – not according to will (Avaśyam as an indeclinable adverb means "necessarily", which is derived from its literal meaning, "not by will", something predetermined as opposed to being by free will.) bhāvitvāt (abl. just because) inevitability (4.2.45) tat-abhāvaḥ it – not existing ca also apavarge (loc. when) done with (4.2.46) tat-artham to that end yama-niyamābhyaṃ (abl. according to) prohibitions – rules, vows ātma-saṁskāraḥ soul – (constructing) the perfect / yogāt (abl. according to) the yoga teaching ca even adhyātma-vidhi-upāyaḥ (inst. by means of) supreme spirit – (√vidhā seems more likely than √vidh with adhyātma.) worshipping – methods
9.1 Even though one would be done with it, there is the occupation with life exactly as it is, (but) it is not the case that, just because of it's inevitability, that (life) which is thus fashioned is not according to one's will. There is also (the notion) that it would \textit{not} exist when one is done with it. To that end, one would construct the perfect (karmic) soul according to prohibitions and vows, and even, according to the \textit{Yoga} (YD 2.1), by methods of worshipping a supreme human spirit (the unifying principle in a modern religious community).

9.2 That discipline of \textit{personal apprehension through true comprehension} is thus in addition to a discussion within the community of these philosophies, for such is to be taken up in the company of students, masters, or fellow brahmacarins, whether distinguished or just desiring something better; with any who are not disdainful; or even in the absence of an adversary \textit{api} even \textit{vā} or

(4.2.47) \textit{jñāna-grahaṇa-abhyāsāḥ} true comprehension – personal apprehension – discipline \textit{tat} thus \textit{vidyaiḥ} (inst. within) paths of higher knowledge, philosophies \textit{ca} in addition to \textit{saha-saṁvādaḥ} in community – conversation with (among) (4.2.48) \textit{tam} (acc.) such \textit{siṣya-guru-sabrahmacāri} – \textit{viśiṣṭa-śreyas-arthibhiḥ} (instr. with, in the company of) students – "heavies" masters – fellow brahmacarins – distinguished – the better (life) – those who desire \textit{anasūyubhiḥ} not disdainful \textit{abhyupeyāt} to be approached or taken up (4.2.49) \textit{pratipakṣa-hīnam} (ind.) in the absence of an adversary \textit{api} even \textit{vā} or

(4.2.49 cont.) \textit{prayojana-artham} motivation – for the purpose of \textit{arthitve} (loc. when) state of desire (4.2.50) \textit{tattva-adhyavasāya-saṁrakṣaṇa-artham} essence – firm resolve – safeguarding, preservation, protection – for the purpose of \textit{jalpa-vitaṇḍe} (loc. when) prattle – pointlessly argumentative \textit{viṇa-praroha-saṁrakṣaṇa-artham} (=\textit{bīja}) seed – sprouting, sprout – safeguarding – purpose \textit{kāntaka-śākhā-āvaraṇavat} thorn – branch – concealing (4.2.50) \textit{tābhyām} (inst. dual) those two \textit{vigṛhya} (ind. part.) having disengaged \textit{kathanam} telling, relating \textit{upasaṁhāre} (loc. when) conclusion, end
9.3 When there is the state of desire (for something better), that (discussion) is for the purpose of motivation. When there is just argumentative prattle (by the disdainful adversary), that (our discussion) is for the purpose of the protection of our firm resolve toward the essence (of knowledge), like a screen of thorny branches for the purpose of protecting the sprouting seed (of knowledge). When that (discussion) is at a conclusion, with those two (factions) having disengaged, there is the telling (of the argument), as follows:

Again, he obliquely recalls the threefold process: the declaration without proof, the proof by examination, and the conclusion on the basis of the examination.

(साध्यत्वें ध्यानम्)

[(5.1.1) sādharmya-vaidharmya-utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-prūpti-aprūpti-prasaṅga-pratidṛṣṭānta-anutpati-saṁśaya-prakaraṇa-hetu-arthāpati-aviṣeṣa-upapatte-upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-nitya-anitya-kārya-samāḥ (5.1.2) sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām (This is just another list, the last two "sama"s of which are made up by the commenter! The commenter to the Yoga does the same thing in its opening sutras.)

तद्यथा विपर्ययोपपत्ते: साध्यत्वें ध्यानम्। गोत्वान्त्रोत्तसिद्धस्थतित्तिंद्रि:। साध्यत्वन्तयोर्ध-मिन्विकल्प्यादुभध्यत्वम्।

(5.1.2 cont.) tat thus, as follows (The translation of this is appended to the previous sentence.) dharma-viparyaya-upapatteḥ (gen. of) their – roles, duties – alternate – evidence sādharmya-vaidharmya-samau conformity – nonconformity – equivalents (5.1.3) gotvāt (abl. by) its being a cow go-siddhivat (vati like) cow – affirmation tat-siddhiḥ it (each) – affirmation (5.1.4) sādhya-dṛṣṭāntayoḥ (loc.) premise – a standard dharma-vikalpāt (abl. apart from) (The comparative, with "equivalent of" or "substitute for", similar but "rather than". The context makes this use of the ablative obvious.) duty – diversity ubhaya-sādhyaḥtvāt (abl. apart from) both – being the premise ca and
9.4 Of our evidence of an opposing version of dharma, there are the (adversaries') equivalents as conformity and nonconformity with (their) dharma, the affirmation of each like the affirmation of a cow just by its being a cow—as apart from our diversity of dharmas in terms of both our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) and our standard (equal value of the diversity of dharmas) and apart from both being the premise.

उत्तर्षपपकर्ष्यवर्गवर्गविकल्पसाध्यसमां:। किचित्साध्याभद्वलसंहारसिद्धेऽधम्याद्यस्तिपिते-ध:। साध्यातिदेशाच्छ दश्चन्तोपपत्ते:।

(5.1.4 cont.) utkarṣa-apakarṣa -varṇya-avarṇya -vilalpa -sādhya-samāḥ superior – inferior – of a certain varṇa caste – not of that caste – diversity – premise – equivalents (5.1.5) kiṁcid sādharmyāt (abl. since) a little – conformity upasāmāra-siddheḥ (abl. because) conclusion – affirming vaidharmyāt (abl. from) not conforming apratiṣedhah no denying (5.1.6) sādhya-atidesāt (abl. apart from) premise – placing beyond reach ca and dṛṣṭānta-upapatteḥ (abl. by) standard – evidence

9.5 There are their equivalents of that premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), as the diversity of the superior, the inferior, those of their (and our) caste, and those not of that caste. Since there is a little conformity (of our own see 1.2.17), we would not deny (our own premise) by refusing to conform with our dharma just because that would affirm our conclusion, or by overruling our premise (dharma=comprehension), by the evidence of our standard (equal value of daily life and the examination of it).

प्राप्य साध्याग्राप्य वा हेतो: प्राप्तिविशेषात्तदात्मात्माध्यायाकल्पवाच प्राप्तिसाद्यानिवृत्त:। घटा-दिनिष्ठ्याद्धर्ष्याप्रीड़ने चायविभिन्नर्धाद्यस्तिपितेः:।

(5.1.7) prāpya (ind. part. √ pra-āp) having attained, reached, or arived (after some time) sādhyam (acc.) premise aprāpya (ind. part.) not having attained vā or / hetoḥ (gen. of) grounds prāptyā (inst. by) gaining, achieving viśiṣṭatvāt (abl. since) becoming distinguished aprāptyā (inst. by) failure to earn asādhakatvāt (abl. since) not becoming accomplished ca and prāpti-aprāpti-samau attaining – not attaining – equivalents (5.1.8) ghāṭa-ādi-nispatti-darśanāt (abl. since) vessels –to begin with – fashioning – seeing piḍane (loc. regarding) molding ca and avyabhicārāt (abl. apart from) not deviating apratiṣedhah no denying
9.6 Of our grounds for knowledge—having either attained (arrived at) our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension), or having not yet attained it—there are the (adversaries') *equivalents* as attaining and not attaining (knowledge), being distinguished by attaining it, and being unaccomplished by failure to attain it. There is no denying (our premise) by seeing 'fashioning' as of a (soul) vessel to begin with, and by (simply) not deviating from that (adversaries' learned knowledge) regarding the molding (of the vessel).

दृष्टांतस्य कारणानीपदेशःतत्त्वस्थानाच प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रसङ्गकारणामेव प्रदीपोपादः-
नप्रसङ्गविनिग्रहितवचनिरहितिः।

9.7 Of our standards—due to their failure to indicate the (proper) cause (*īśvara* 4.1.19) and due to their opposition of life-standing as a counterpart to our standard—there are the (adversaries') equivalents as that life-occupation (of opposition) and as that counterpart to our standard. Turning away from that (cause) is like turning away from a life-occupation in the self-acceptance (taught) by our treatise.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुते च नाहेतुदृष्टान्तः। प्रागुत्तप्ते: कारणानीवादत्त्वतत्त्वित्तिः। तथाभावादृ-
त्त्वञ्जस्य कारणोपपत्तेन्त्कारणास्वितेः।

9.7 Of our standards—due to their failure to indicate the (proper) cause (*īśvara* 4.1.19) and due to their opposition of life-standing as a counterpart to our standard—there are the (adversaries') equivalents as that life-occupation (of opposition) and as that counterpart to our standard. Turning away from that (cause) is like turning away from a life-occupation in the self-acceptance (taught) by our treatise.


(5.1.10) *prati-dṛṣṭānta-hetu-tve* (loc. even with) counterpart – standard – grounds – there being *ca na* not (never) even *a-hetu-dṛṣṭāntaḥ* without – grounds – standard (5.1.11) *prāṇc-upatṭhe* (gen. of) before birth state *kāraṇa-abhāvāt* (abl. according to) cause – empty *anupatti-samaṇaḥ* non-birth – equivalent (5.1.12) *tathā* similarly *bhāvāt* (abl. according to) theory of being, view // *utpannasaya* (gen. of) born, having come into existence *kāraṇa-upapatteḥ* (abl. because) cause – evidence *na no kāraṇa-pratisedhaḥ* cause – denial
9.9 Even with there being (two) counterparts within the grounds for our standard, we are never without that (dual) standard (including the *existence* of life) in our grounds. Of our pre-existent (unmanifest see avyakta 3.2.43) state, there is the (adversaries’) equivalent of (a liberation of) *not* coming into existence at all, according to their empty cause (karma). Similarly, according to *our* view, there can be no denying of our cause (īśvara), because of our evidence that it is the cause of whatever has come into existence.

(5.1.13) *sāmānya-dṛṣṭāntayoh* (gen. dual of) common truth – standard *aindriyakatve* (loc. in that) existing in that which consists of the powers of sense *samāne* (loc. considering) same *nitya-anitya-sādharmyāt* (abl. due to) constant – inconstant *saṁśaya-samaḥ* uncertainty – equivalent (5.1.14) *sādharmyāt* (abl. just because) conformity *saṁśaye* (loc. in) uncertainty [na saṁśayaḥ // vaidharm-yāt ubhayathā vā saṁśaye atyanta-saṁśaya-prasaṅgaḥ; One must not doubt. In his nonconformity or in his 'both ways', whenever he doubts, it becomes his 'ultimate doubt'.] *nityatva-anabhyupagamāt* (abl. just because) constancy – disagreement *ca* and *sāmānyasya* (gen. of) the common *apratiṣedhaḥ* no denying

9.10 Of (the uncertainty as to) the universally agreed (dharma) vs. our standard (equal value of the diverse dharmas of those just living life and those seeking to examine it)—*considering that they are (both) the same in that they exist only in the mind* ("that which consists of the powers of sense")—there is the (adversaries') equivalent, as the uncertainty that arises from constant vs. inconstant conformity. There is no denying (of our premise) just because there is conformity in that uncertainty, and just because there is disagreement with our constancy on the part of the common (man).

The adversary's uncertainty would cause him to lapse in his adherence to proper civil and religious behaviors, which in their belief system would result in a certain bad karma that would in turn cause further doubt and further lapsing in future incarnations. This is the interpretation of the commenter in 2.1.7 and 5.1.14.
Of our affirmation by our formal practice (of contemplation 4.2.38-42), with our conformity being both ways, there is the (adversaries') equivalent to the subject (of dharma), by (the practice of) proving that subject against an adversary (4.2.47-50). We lack the evidence to deny that (existence of an adversary) because that (denial) would be the very evidence of an adversary. (see the "other … other … other" passage in 2.1.30-32) Of our grounds for knowledge, without any evidence of a threefold time paradigm, there is the (adversaries') equivalent that is without our grounds (i.e., *with* a karmic past and future).

(5.1.19) pratiṣedha-anupapatteḥ (abl. since) denial – lacking evidence ca w/na either *pratiṣeddhavya-apratiṣedhah* to be denied – no denying (5.1.20) arthāpattītaḥ (tasil according to) interpretation *pratipakṣa-siddhēḥ* (gen. of) adversaries – affirmation *arthāpatti-samaḥ* interpretation – equivalent

(5.1.18) na not (*referring to the nom. "asiddhi") *hetutaḥ* (tasil resulting from) grounds *sādhya-siddhēḥ* (abl. because) premise – affirmation *traikālya-asiddhīḥ* threefold time paradigm – without affirmation (5.1.19) *pratiṣedha-anupapatteḥ* (abl. since) denial – lacking evidence *ca* w/na either *pratiṣeddhavya-apratiṣedhah* to be denied – no denying (5.1.20) *arthāpattītaḥ* (tasil according to) interpretation *pratipakṣa-siddhēḥ* (gen. of) adversaries – affirmation *arthāpatti-samaḥ* interpretation – equivalent
9.12 We are not without any affirmation of the threefold time paradigm (cf. 2.1.12-14), because the affirmation of our premise (that the highest dharma is by true comprehension) results (only) from our grounds for knowledge (our 'cause'). They cannot deny anything which (they say) is to be denied either, since they lack the evidence to deny it. Of the affirmation of adversaries according to our interpretation (of traditional texts), there is the (adversaries') equivalent interpretation.

9.13 Their evidence is by rejection of some side that comes about through an interpretation of anything not declared (in the smṛti). Such (a rejection) of our interpretation is because of its not being declared (in the smṛti), and because of its not being their exclusive way. Of our evidence of a primary reality known by occupation with life without distinguishing an 'everyone', that absence of distinction being known by the evidence of the singular dharma (as opposed to "for the many" 1.1.23, 2.1.1), there is the (adversaries') equivalent of not distinguishing.

The "singular dharma" here is the dharma "without superior" given in the first sutra as the subject of the entire treatise. Here it is stated anew as the subject and subsequently recalled with or without pronouns in every sutra up to the conclusion of the work.
9.14 Their empty denial is, in the one (our) case, of the evidence of that (singular) dharma, and in the other (their) case, of their (own) failed evidence. That (tautological) evidence is their equivalent of our evidence that there is 'cause' in both (dharman), (but) they cannot deny (our premise) just because we permit a 'cause' in our evidence (cf. 3.2.7).

9.15 Even though there is no substance to their dictated cause (karma), out of their recognition of that (karma) there arises their equivalent observation (of dharma), (but) they cannot deny (our premise) by (asserting) that 'cause' (karma) that is so very different from our evidence of that (singular 5.1.22) dharma, for out of their non-recognition (of our cause), arises their lack of observation of that (singular dharma).
**The Nyaya Darshana**

_9.16 Out of the evidence in opposition to that (unique dharma) in their empty affirmation, there arises their equivalent lack of observation. Their lack of grounds for knowledge is due to the lack of observation (of the unique dharma), for that is the very nature of their lack of recognition and of their 'comprehension' of (three) kinds (castes of individuals), (but) when it comes to the individual self, that (comprehension) must come from the presence vs. absence of the internal feel._

He is speaking here about the two different views of dharma that have been thoroughly discussed earlier. The adversary (within us) denies, without distinction, both the immediate evidence of his "unique" dharma and the weakness of his own tautological evidence for the scheme of caste, karma, reincarnation, etc. It seems to me that the author uses the term "aviśeṣa" in the same sense that "aviveka" is used by the Sankhya and Yoga, to mean "non-distinguishing" as causing bondage.

(5.1.31) _sādharmyāt_ (abl. known by) conformity _tulya-dharma-upapatteḥ_ (gen. of) equals, peers – duty – evidence _sarva-anityatva-prasaṅgāt_ (abl. due to) everyone – inconstancy – occupation _anitya-samaḥ_ inconstant – equivalent (5.1.32) _sādharmyāt_ (abl. apart from, other than) conformity with dharma _asiddheḥ_ (abl. since) no affirmation _pratiṣedha-asiddhiḥ_ denial – no affirmation _pratiṣedhyā-sāmarthyāt_ (abl. because) to be denied – having common interest.
9.17 Of our evidence of the dharma of the peers, which we know by our own conformity with it, since that is our occupation with the inconstancy of the 'everyone'; there is the (adversaries') equivalent of what is 'inconstant' (our deviation). Since there is no affirmation of that, apart from their own conformity (with dharma), there can be no affirmation of their denial (of our deviation) just because they have common interest in what should be denied.

दृष्टन्ते च साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञातस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वात्स्य चोभयथाभावान्तविशेषः।

(5.1.33) **दृष्टन्ते** (loc. when it comes to) **साध्य-साधना-भावेन** (inst. known by means of) premise – established – view // **प्रज्ञा** true knowledge, wisdom **तस्या** (gen. of) that **दharma** (gen. of) duty, right **हेतुवत्** (abl. resulting from) motivation **तस्या** (gen. of) that **साधना-भावेन** indeed / **उभयथाः** both ways **भावत्** (abl. for) view **ना viśeṣaḥ** difference

9.18 Moreover, when it comes to our standard, that is known by means of the view established by our premise. True knowledge of that (view) is that (true knowledge) of dharma, and (true knowledge) of that (dharma) is the result of one's motivation. There is no difference (between motivation towards true knowledge and dharma), for our view is both ways.

**End of the Nyaya Darshana**

It is clear to me that the Nyaya Darshana ends here and that the remaining material is something else, even though the style looks similar:
सन्त्यमसन्त्यभमावमादसन्त्य-मसनत्यतयोपपत्ति-मसनरत्यसमन्निः॥५।१।३४॥ प्रसतष-मध्यमसनत्यभमावमादसनत्य-मसनत्यतयोपपत्ति-मसनरत्यसमन्निः।॥३५॥ प्रयत्नरमायमा-रन्यतम प्रयत्नमाह-मतमन-मपलसब्धिरमारणयोपपत्ति-मन्निः॥३७॥ प्रसतष-मधिसव-प्रसतष-मधिम-प्रसतष-मधिदयोषवद्दयोषन्निः॥४०॥ प्रसतष-मधिसवप्रसतष-मधिम-प्रसतष-मधिदयोषमभ-मपगममातममानयो दयोषन्निः॥४१॥

(इति प्रथमाधिकः)

(प्रश्मोऽवयः द्वितीयाधिकः )

प्रतिज्ञाहानि: प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंपन्नाः हेतुवत्तरमथासरं निर्देशकमविश्लेषा तथा तर्कमपार्थक-प्राप्तकालेन न्यूनमधिकं पुनःकत्तमननुभाषणमवज्ञानमप्रतिभा विशेषाय मतानु-ढा पर्यन्तनुजोपक्षणं निर्नयोज्यानुयोगोपसिद्धान्तो हेतुवावश्च निग्रहस्थानानि॥ १॥ प्रतिज्ञान्तरमभेयतमज्ञा सवर्धात्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानि: || २॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिज्ञाये धर्मविश्लेषा द्वितीयन्त्रा: प्रतिज्ञान्तरम: || ३॥ प्रतिज्ञाहेतुवारोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः || ४॥ पश्चाप्रतिज्ञाये प्रति-ज्ञातार्थपन्यन्त्रां प्रतिज्ञासंपन्नाः || ५॥ अविद्याप्रक्षेते हेतु ततो प्रतिपित्रे विशेषोपविच्यो धर्मवत्तरम: || ६॥ प्रक्षात्तार्थप्रतिज्ञासंपीवर्यवार्थमान्तरम: || ७॥ वर्णकमनिदेशविश्लेषयथकम || ८॥ परिष्टप्रतिज्ञादिभ्यं त्रिधितमात्मप्रतिज्ञातार्थस्वर्यर्यवार्थम: || ९॥ पौर्णायगाद्यप्रतिज्ञास्वर्यर्यवार्थस्वर्यर्यवार्थम: || १०॥ अविशेषस्वविशेषस्वस्वप्राप्तमान्तरम: || ११॥ हीनमन्यतमेनाय पत्तब्दन्यूनम: || १२॥ हेतुतदहरणाधिकमधिकम: || १३॥ शाब्दार्थोऽपि: पुनःकत्तम ननुभाषणस्ववादात् || १४॥ अर्थादाप्रस्तर्थ स्वशाब्देन पुनःकत्तम पुनःकत्तम || १५॥ विश्लेषाय परिष्टादा
गुरुभिन्नित्योपयत्रुचारमननुभाषणम् इ। १६।। अविज्ञात चाहिन्नम् । १७।। उत्तरस्य-प्रतिपत्तिः। ॥ । १८।। कार्यवाचास्त्राकथ हिस्सैं दृश्यः । १९।। स्वपनस्य दोषाभ्युप-गमात्वरपक्ष सोपशगती मतानुवृत्ता ॥ २०।। नियमस्थानप्राप्तस्यात्मनिविधः पर्यन्तनौपर्यस्प-क्षणम् ॥ २१।। अनियमस्थाने नियमस्थानाथा निर्विनन्योव्यायोऽछ। ॥ २२।। सिद्धान्त-मभुपेत्यानियमात्मकथाप्रसारंपरिद्विवः ॥ २३।। हेत्याभासाध्य यथोक्तः ॥ २४।।

(5.1.34) nityam anitya-bhāvat anitye nityatva-upapatteḥ nitya-samaḥ
(5.1.35) pratiṣedhye nityam anitya-bhāvat anitye anityatva-upapatteḥ pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ (5.1.36) prayatna-kārya-anekatvāt kārya-samaḥ (5.1.37) kārya-anyatve prayatna-ahetutvam anupalabdhi-kāraṇa-upapatteḥ (5.1.38) pratiṣedhe_api samānaḥ doṣaḥ (5.1.39) sarvatra evam (5.1.40) pratiṣedha-vipratiṣedhe pratiṣedha-dōṣavat doṣaḥ (5.1.41) pratiṣedham sadoṣam abhyupetaḥ pratiṣedha-vipratiṣedhe samānaḥ doṣa-prasāṅgaḥ mata-anujñā svapakṣa-lakṣaṇa-apekṣa-upapattī-upasamīhāre hetu-nirdēse parapaṅkṣa-dōṣa-abhyupagamāt samānaḥ doṣaḥ (5.2.1) pratijñā-ḥānīḥ pratijñā-antaram pratiṣedja-virodhāḥ pratijñā-saṁnyāsāḥ hetu-antaram arthāntaram nirarthakam avijñāta-artham apārthakam aprāpta-kālam nyūnam adhikam punar-uktam ananubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā viṣeṣaḥ mata-anujñā paryanuṣojuya-apekṣaṇa niranuṣojuya-anuyogāḥ apasiddhāntāḥ hetu-ābhāsāḥ ca nirghra-sthānāni (5.2.2) pratidrṣṭānta-dharma-abhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānta praṭijñā-ahāniḥ (5.2.3) pratijñāta-artha-pratiṣedhe dharma-vikalpaḥ tat-artha-nirdeṣaḥ pratijñā-antaram (5.2.4) pratijñā-ahetvoḥ virodhāḥ pratijñā-avirodhāḥ (5.2.5) pakṣa-pratiṣedhe pratijñāta-artha-apanayanam pratijñā-vaṁśīyāsāḥ (5.2.6) aviseṣa-ukte hetau pratiṣiddhē viṣeṣam icchataḥ hetu-antaram (5.2.7) prakṛtāḥ arthātapratisambaddha-arthaḥ artha-antaram (5.2.8) varṇa-krama-nirdeṣaṇaḥ nirarthakam aprāpta-kālam nyūnam adhikam punar-uktam ananubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā viṣeṣaḥ mata-anujñā paryanuṣojuya-apekṣaṇa niranuṣojuya-anuyogāḥ apasiddhāntāḥ hetu-ābhāsāḥ ca nirghra-sthānāni (5.2.2) pratidrṣṭānta-dharma-abhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānta praṭijñā-ahāniḥ (5.2.3) pratijñāta-artha-pratiṣedhe dharma-vikalpaḥ tat-artha-nirdeṣaḥ pratijñā-antaram (5.2.4) pratijñā-ahetvoḥ virodhāḥ pratijñā-avirodhāḥ (5.2.5) pakṣa-pratiṣedhe pratijñāta-artha-apanayanam pratijñā-vaṁśīyāsāḥ (5.2.6) aviseṣa-ukte hetau pratiṣiddhē viṣeṣam icchataḥ hetu-antaram (5.2.7) prakṛtāḥ arthātapratisambaddha-arthaḥ artha-antaram (5.2.8) varṇa-krama-nirdeṣaṇaḥ nirarthakam aprāpta-kālam (5.2.9) pari-ṣat-pratīvādiḥ bhīmaṁ trīś-abhihitām api avijñātām avijñāta-arthaḥ (5.2.10) paurvāyogāḥ apratitaśambaddha-artham aprāpta-kālam (5.2.11) avayava-viparyāsa-vaṇcamāna aprāpta-kālam (5.2.12) hīnām anya-tamena api avayavena nyūnam (5.2.13) hetu-udāharaṇa-adhikām adhikām (5.2.14) śabda-arthaḥ punar vaṇcanām punar-uktam anyatra anuvādāt (5.2.15) arthāḥ āpānāsya svaśabdena punar-vaṇcamāna punar-uktam (5.2.16) vijñātaḥ pariṣadā trīś-abhihitasya api apratīvuccāraṇam anubhāṣaṇam (5.2.17) avijñātām ca ajñānam (5.2.18) uttarasya-apratipattiḥ apratibhā (5.2.19) kārya-vyāsaṅgāt kathā vicchedāḥ
vikṣepaḥ (5.2.20) svapakṣe doṣa-abhyupagamāt parapakṣe doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ mata-anujñā (5.2.21) nigrahasthāna-prāptasya anigrahaḥ paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇam (5.2.22) anigrahasthāne nigrahasthāna-abhiyogaḥ niranuyojya-anuyogaḥ (5.2.23) siddhāntam abhyupetya aniyamāt kathā prasaṅgaḥ apasiddhāntaḥ (5.2.24) hetu-ābhāsāḥ ca yathā-uktāḥ